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IN\TRODUCTION
This Essay seeks to address the issue of equality amongst the
European Union's citizens. How has the European Union
succeeded since its inception more than half a century ago in
giving rights under EU law to citizens who, because of their
specific characteristics, attributes, or position in life, are viewed
as inferior to others and consequently treated differently to their
ultimate prejudice?
The general principle of equality governs the exercise of
Union competence and the means by which Member States can
transpose EU law into their national legal systems. This principle
precludes comparable situations from being treated differently
or different situations being treated equally unless there is an
objective justification for doing so.' The general principle of
* Professor of Law, City University London, Barrister, Essex Court Chambers.
london.
1. See Albert Ruckdeschel & Co. & Dianialt AG v. I-auptzollamnt Itzenhoe, Joined
Cases 117/76 & 16/77, [1977] E.C.R. 1753,
7; see also TAKS TRDIMAS, THE GENERAL

PRINCIPIES OF EU ILAW 61-62 (2d ed. 2006). See ge er(aly Koen Lenaerts & Jose
GuttiLrrez-Fons, The ConstitutionalAllocation of Powers and General Principles of EU Law,

1426

20121

EQUALITY BETWEEN EUROPE'S CITIZENS

1427

equality finds specific expression in a number of provisions of
the treaties that govern the European Union, in the Charter of
Fundamental Rights, and in legislation. These instruments
proscribe discrimination on specific grounds including
nationality, gender, race, age, religion or belief, disability, and
sexual orientation. These instruments have been the subject of
an extensive body of case law emanating from the European
Court of Justice ("Cj" or "Court"). The effect of this case law in
combating discrimination is extensive. It has influenced, if not
indeed led, both legislative and treaty development.
This Essay is concerned with discrimination between EU
citizens in the social and employment spheres. It does not
extend to discrimination on an economic level. Part I of this
Essay considers briefly the evolution of equality law in the
European Union up to the present day. Part 11 then considers
the application of the principle of equal treatment between
nationals; men and women; and the elimination of
discrimination on the grounds of race or ethnic origin, age,
religion, disability, and sexual orientation. Equality on the basis
of nationality developed mainly through the case law of the CJ:
there is no specific legislative instrument dealing with national
discrimination generally. This case law will be considered first,
followed by a discussion of the legislative instruments as
interpreted by the cJ that deal with the other prohibited
grounds of discrimination. Finally, Part III discusses the present
state of equality law: has the Union managed to achieve its
goals? Has equality of treatment as set out in the various Union
instruments been achieved? If not, why not? What remains to be
done to achieve the goals set out in the treaties and the Charter
of Fundamental Rights?
I. EVOL UTION: THREE PHASES-ROME TO LISBON
The right to equal treatment between employed persons
having the nationality of a Member State with respect to access
to employment remuneration and other conditions of work and
employment are assured by Article 45 of the Treaty on the

47 COMMON MKT. L. RV. 1629 (2010)

Union's approach to discrimination).

(providing background on the European
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Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU"). 2 Directive
1612/68 1 implemented the principle of equal treatment, Thus,
for example, nationals of a Member State who take up
employment in another Member State have the right to
vocational training under the same conditions as nationals of
their host Member State. 4 In addition, they have the right to the
same "social and tax advantages," a concept that has been
interpreted broadly by the (J.4The broad scope of these rights
is designed to achieve the total integration of the worker and his
family into the society of the host Member State. This departs
from the traditional view that prevailed when the European
Economic Community ("EEC") came into being-that of the
migrant as being a mere economic tool. The view of the
founding fathers of the European Union was that the worker
and his family should have the right-and should be facilitated
in the exercise of that right-to integrate into the Member State
in which he chooses to be economically active.
Equality also was established within Article 119 of the
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community ("EEC
Treat-"), which provided for equal pay for men and women
doing equal work. It appears to have been drafted originally to
address economic concerns. The Ohlin Committee, 7 set up in
1956 to examine what the social aspects of the future EEC
should be, concluded that there was only one aspect of social
2. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 45, 2010 () J. C 83/47, at 65-66 [hereinalter TFEU].
3. Council Regulation No. 1612/68/EE( on Freedom of Movement tir Workers
Within the Community, 1968 OJ. L 257/2.
4. See id. art. 7, at 5.

5. See id.; see also, e.g., Schmid v. Belgian State, Case C-310/91. [1993] E.C.R. 13011 (addressing such matters as an allowance tor handicapped adults); Frascogna v.
Caisse des I)ep6ts et Consignations, Case 256/86, [1987] E.C.R. 3431 (addressing
minimum income

benefits); Hoeckx v. Openbaar Cenurn

voor Maatschappelijk

Welzijn. Kahimthout, Case 249/83. [1985] E.C.R. 973 (addressing special
unemployment benefits); Office National de l'Emploi v. Deak, Case 94/84, [1985]
E.C.R. 1873 (addressing special unemployment benefits); Reina v. Landeskieditbank,
Case 65/81. [1982] E.C.R. 33 (addressing interest free loans granted on childbirth):
Cristini v. Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Fran'ais, Case 32/75, [1975] E.C.R.
1085 (addressing tare reduction cards by railway companies).
6. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic (ommunity, Mar. 25. 1957, art.
119, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 62 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
7. This was a group of independent experts appointed by the International
Labour Organisation chaired by Professor Ohlin. See Social Aspects ojEuropean Economic
Co-operation, 74 INT'LI LAB. REV. 99, 99 n. 1 (1956) (listing the committee members).
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policy that should be regulated on a European level and that was
the pay levels of the female workforce. At that time, with few
exceptions, notably France, women were paid at a lower rate
than men. The Committee concluded that this could lead to a
distortion in production costs with consequent imbalances in
8
competition conditions within the common market.
Article 119 seems therefore to have been designed to
ensure free and fair competition-nothing more. It was not
viewed in the early years of the European Union as having a
social objective, 9 although, with the evolution of the European
Union from a regional trading area, purely economic in nature,
to a fully integrated internal market concerned with the well
being of its citizens and their fundamental rights, the Cj placed
a broader interpretation on Article 119, finding its primary aim
to be social: "[T]he economic aim pursued by Article 119..
. namely the elimination of distortions of competition between
undertakings established in different Member States, is
secondary to the social aim pursued by the same provision,
which constitutes the expression of a fundamental human
right."10
The European Union's equality law has developed in three
phases, each of which reflects a growing commitment to the
principle of equality and respect for human rights. The first
phase in the development of EU equality law ran from 1957 to
1987. What is now the European Union had its origins in the
EEC, which was created by the EEC Treaty, also known as the
Treaty of Rome, on March 25, 1957. 1 The EEC Treaty
contained a number of references to the concept of equal
treatment, most of which were concerned with economic
operators. There was one general provision, the potential of
which was certainly never realized by the founding fathers of the
European Union, and yet with the passage of time has possibly
had the greatest impact upon the daily lives of citizens living and

8. INT'I LABOUR ORG., No. 46, SOCIAL ASPECTS OF FUROPEAN ECONOMIC COOPELRATION 1[ 109 (1956). For a sumLinar of the report, see generally Social Aspects of

European Economic Co-operatio, supra note 7.
9. See Daniela Caruso, Limi s oj the Classic Method: Positive Action in the Eurpean
Union After the New Equality Directives. 44 HARv. INT'L LJ. 331, 337 (2003).
10. Deutsche Telkoim AG v. Schroder, Case C-50/96. [2000] E.C.R. 1-743, 1[ 57.
11 LEEC Treaty, supra note 6.
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working within the European Union. That provision is Article 6
of the EEC Treaty, which is now Article 18 of the TFEU. It states
that: "Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and
without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein,
any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be
prohibited." 12 The essence of this provision has remained
unchanged throughout the many Treaty revisions and
amendments that have occurred in the past quarter of a century.
Moreover, the CJ has held that this Article requires Member
States to provide "perfect" or "absolute" equality of treatment
between its own nationals and those of other Member States. 3
Thus, the prohibition is generally uncompromising.
In addition to prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
nationality in the sphere of employment in what is now Article
45 of the TFEU, and, more generally, with respect to all matters
within the scope of the Treaty, the original EEC Treaty laid
down the principle of equal pay for men and women.
Article 119 did not prohibit discrimination between men
and women in the matter of pay nor did it provide for the
adoption of legislative measures to enforce this principle,
relying instead on requiring the Member States themselves to
bring about equal pay for equal work within their own legal
systems by December 31, 1961. This deadline was not respected,
and the Member States passed a resolution on the matter in late
December 1961 giving themselves an extension until December
31, 1964 to achieve equality between men and women in pay.
Articles 7, 45, and 119 of the EEC Treaty, were the only
provisions granting the European Union competence to adopt
measures on discrimination between Europe's citizens until the
Treaty of Amsterdam ("ToA"), 1 4 which came into force in 1997.

12. Compare TFEU, supa note 2, art. 18, 2010 OJ.C 83. at 56. with EEC Treaty,
supra note 6, art. 6,at 17.
13. See, e.g., Hayes v. Kionenberger, Case C-323/95. [1997] E.(.R. 1-1711. 1[18;
Data Delecta Aktiebolag v.MSL Dynamics Ltd., Case C-43/95. [1996] E.(.R. 1-4661,

16.
14. Treat of instcrdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European (oumnunities and Certain Related Acts, 1997 O.J. ( 340/1
[hereinafter Treaty ofAnsterdan].
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In 1974, the European Council passed a resolution
concerning a social action program, 15 which included amongst
its priorities "action for the purpose of achieving equality
between men and women as regards access to employment and
vocational training and promotion and as regards working
conditions including pay." '1 The European Commission
("Commission") thus began drawing up proposals for what
ultimately became the Equal Pay Directive, 17 adopted on
February 10, 1975. Article 3 of the Equal Pay Directive obliged
the Member States to abolish all discrimination between men
and women in laws, regulations, and administrative provisions
which were contrary to the principle of equal pay.', Employees
were required to be informed of the provisions adopted in
pursuance of the Directive.' Article 4 obliged Member States to
ensure that "collective agreements, wage scales, wage
agreements or individual contracts of employment" that were
"contrary to the principle of equal pay... be declared null and
2
void or may be amended. 0
In the meantime, Miss Gabrielle Defrenne, an air
stewardess with the now defunct national Belgian airline
SABENA, began a series of actions complaining of
discrimination with respect to her pension rights pay and some
of her working conditions, all which she claimed were less
favorable than those of her male colleagues doing the same
work. In the second of these actions, DeJrenne I,21 Miss Defrenne
relied upon Ai ticle 119 in support of her claim. In a preliminary
ruling referred to the Cj by the Cour de Travail Brussels, the
Court was asked whether Article 119 had direct effect with the
result that workers could rely on it before national courts to
claim equal pay. The Court held that indeed they could. It

15. Council Resolution of 21 January 1974, 1974 O.J. C 13/1 (Social Action
Program).
16. Id.at 2.
17. Council Directive 75/117/EEC on the Approximation of the Laws of the
Member Sttes Relating to the Application of the Principle of Equal Pay for Men and
Women, 197J 04. L 45/19 [hereinafter Equal Pay Directive].
18. See id.
art. 3. at 20.
19. See id.
art. 7, at 20.
20. Id.art. 5,at 20.
21. See Defrenine v. Socict6 Anonymie Belge de Navigation Adrienne Sabena
(Defirenne L), Case 43/75, [1976] E.C.R. 455.
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began its analysis of the issue by stating that Article 119 had a
double aim: 1) to ensure free and fair competition by avoiding
prejudice to undertakings that were obliged by law to offer equal
pay to their workforce as opposed to those who were not, and 2)
it also had the social aim of improving working conditions and
living standards.
The Court went on to find that Article 119 was "directly
applicable and may thus give rise to individual rights which the
courts must protect."22 It imposed upon Member States a duty to
bring about a specific result within a fixed period. Article 119
was not a vague declaration nor did it give the Member States
any discretion as to the attainment of its objective. The Court
pronounced the principle of equal pay to be one of the
foundations of the European Community ("Community") that
must be attained by raising the lowest salaries rather than
lowering the highest. Women's pay was to move up to the level
of that of men.2
The DeJrenne II case was, at the time, viewed as dramatic.
Far from the Member States meandering gently on their own
terms towards equal pay for men and women, the objective was
achieved by the cJ declaring equal pay to be a directly effective
right, the substance of which could not be limited by national
legislation. Given the potentially grave financial consequences of
its judgment for many sectors of industry, the Court limited the
temporal effect of its judgment: Article 119 could not be relied
upon to support claims for pay periods prior to the date of
judgment, April 8, 1976, save with respect to those claimants
who had instituted proceedings prior to that date24
The Equal Pay Directive came into force some eight weeks
before the judgment in DeJrenne II was pronounced. That
judgment did not make the directive in any way redundant, and
required no amendment to its provisions. From being perceived,
22. Id. 24.
23. See Pensioentonds v. Beune, Case C-7/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-4471, 1 28 (holding
that the "meaning and scope of [the principle of equal pay] cannot .. be determined
by a formal criterion. which is [in] itself dependent upon [a] rule[] or practice[]
tollowed in the Member States").
24. A similar approach was adopted in Baber v. G
dia Royl Ex-h-eg' As a#-rce
Group, which found to everyone's apparent astonishment that occupational pensions
were part of pay. See Barber v. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance Grp., Case (-262/88,
[1990] E.C.R. 1-1889, 1 30.
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as it was at the time of its adoption, as the sole source of
enforceable equal pay rights, the directive instead became
complementary with and subject to Article 119. The directive
could not detract from Article 119's provisions and its main role
was to provide a source of rights for those cases of indirect
discrimination that could not be dealt with under Article 119. As
stated in Defrenne I: "Directive No 75/117 ...was intended to
encourage the proper implementation of Article 119... in
order, in particular, to eliminate indirect forms of
discrimination, but was unable to reduce the effectiveness of
'25
that Aticle or modify its temporal effect.'
In two other sets of proceedings instituted by Miss
Defrenne, the Court found that Article 119 related to pay only,
it did not require equal treatment with respect to working
7
conditions 26 or within state social security systems.
Accordingly, following these judgments two directives were
adopted in 1976 and 1978 respectively: the Equal Opportunities
Directive 28 and the Equal Treatment in Social Security
Directive.2- In 1986, the Equality of Treatment in Occupational
Welfare Schemes30 was adopted in the mistaken belief that the
concept of "pay" did not extend to occupational welfare

25. Def#rnne I, [1976] E.C.R. 455, 1 60. While this seemed to rule out any
interpretation of the directive that could limit the effectiveness of Article 119 but did

not detract irom the possibility that it might have a broader approach than Article 119,
in Jenkus v. K gsgate (Clothig Productions) Ltd., Case 96/80, [1981] E.C.R. 912. 1 22,
and Legerich v.Helmig. Joined Cases C-399/92, 409/92, 425/92, 34/93, 50/93. 78/93.
[1994] E.C.R. I5727,
19, the Court indicated that the scope of both instruments was
coteriminous.

26. See Dfctennc v. Socidtd Anonync Beige dc Navigation Adriennc Sabena
(Deenne II),, Case 149/77, [1978] E.C.R. 1365, 24.
27. See Dclenne v.Belgium (Defreime 1). [1971] Case 80/70. E.C.R. 445.
28. See Council Directive 76/207/EE( on the impiementation of the Principle of
Equal Treatment for Men and Women as Regards Access to Employment, Vocational
Training and Promotion, and Working Conditions, 1976 O.J. L 39/40. at 40
[hereinafter Equal Opportunities Directive].
29. See Council Directive 79/7/EEC on the Progressive Implementation of the
Principle of Equal Treatlent fir Men and Women in MattCrs of Social Security, 1979
OJ. L 6/24 [hereinater Equal Trcatment in Social Security Directive].
30. See Council Directive 86/378/EEC on the Implementation of the Principle of
Equal Treatmcnt finr Men and Women in Occupational Social Security Schemes, 1986
OJ. L 225/40 [hereinater Equality of Trcatmnen in Occupational Weltare Schemes
Directive].
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schemes such as pensions and thus specific legislation was
required to ensure the equal treatment of men and women. 1

Following the DeJrenne cases and the adoption of the four
directives on equal treatment between men and women, a steady
flow of references for preliminary rulings arrived at the J from
courts and tribunals throughout the European Union before
which claims for equal treatment, brought overwhelmingly by
women, had been commenced. It was during this decade that
the Court began to put flesh on skeletal legislative provisions,
which left key concepts largely undefined and thus their scope
32
of application and concrete effects undetermined.
The second phase in the evolution of equality law ran from
1987 to 1997. This was a decade of great change. The EEC
Treaty was amended for the first time since its adoption thirty
years earlier, and not just once but three times. The face of
equality law changed both as a result of these amendments and
the continuing stream of case law emanating from the cJ.
3
The Single European Act was adopted in February 1986. 3 It
entered into force on July 1, 1987. This extension of qualified
majority voting to the field of health and safety enabled the
adoption of the Pregnancy Directive, 34 which lays down a
number of standards designed to promote the welfare of
pregnant workers and those who have recently given birth.5
Article 10 of the Pregnancy Directive enshrines the right of
pregnant women not to be dismissed during the period
commencing with the beginning of the pregnancy until the end
of maternity leave, save in exceptional cases not connected with
31. See Barber v. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance Grp., Case C-262/88, [1990]
E.C.R. 1-1889, [ 30 (holding occupational pensions to be "pay" under Article 119).
32. See generally SIOFRA O'LEARY, EMPI .OYMENT IAW AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE:JUDICAL STRUCTURES, POLICIES AN) PROCESSES (2002); Philippa Watson,
Creative Responses in Unchartered Territor. in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE:EMERGING
TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ANT) COMPARATVE l AW 453 (Malcolm Langlord ed., 2009);

Philippa Watson, The Role of the Euopean Court offitstice in the Development of Cornnunit
Labour Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND) LABOUR LAyv: ESSAYS FOR PAUL O'HIGGINS 76 (K.D.

Ewing et al. eds., 1994).
33. See Single European Act, 1987 oJ. L 169/1.
34. See Council Directive 92/85/EEC on the Introduction of Measures to
Encourage Improvements in the Safety and Health at Work of Pregnant Workers and
Workers Who Have Recently Given Birth or Are Breastfeeding, 1992 OJ. L 348/1
[hereinafter Pregnancy Directive].
35. See id. art. 1(1), at 2.
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their pregnancy a This provision has been held to be of direct
effect and may be relied upon before national courts and
tribunals in actions against state authorities,37 and is discussed in
more detail below.
The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for
Workers ("Social Charter") was adopted in December 1989.3 It
was the first use of a charter to express a commitment on the
part of the Member States to commonly held values. Amongst
the Social Charter's provisions was an affirmation of the right of
equal treatment for men and women in employment, in
paragraph 16.39 The United Kingdom, opposed to any extension
of Community competence in the social field, was not a party to
the Social Charter.
From the late 1980s, the right to not be subject to
differential treatment on grounds of nationality began to be
extended by the cJ beyond the economic sphere. 40
Discrimination on the grounds of nationality is discussed below.
In the decade preceding the adoption of the ToA there
were a number of initiatives, which sought both to heighten
awareness of the issue of racial discrimination and to seek means
by which it could be at least attenuated, if not altogether
eliminated. A rise in immigration highlighted racist attitudes
within the Member States during the 1990s. Increased lobbying,
particularly by the Starting Line Group, an organization
representing some 400 nongovernmental organizations
established in 1991,41 focused on the adoption of legislation on a

36. See id. art. 10, at 4.
37. See, e.g., Melgar v. Ayntamiento de I.os Barrios, Case C-438/99, [2009] E.C.R.
1-6915, [ 34.
38.

Commission

of

the

European

Communities,

Community

Charter

of

Fundamental Social Rights, C()M (89) 471 Final (Oct. 1989).
39. See id. 1[ 16.
40. See, e.g., Cowan v. Le Trsor Public, Case (-186/87, [1989] E.C.R. 216, [ 20.
41. At the initiative of the British Commission for Racial Equality, the D)utch
National Bureau Against Racism, and the Churches Commission for Migrants in
Europe, other pan-European organizations soon joined groups including the European
Jewish Information Centre, the European Anti-Poverty Network, the Belgian Centre for
Equal Opportunities, and the Commissioner for Foreigners of the Berlin Senate. See
Isabelle Chopin, The Starting Line Group: A Harmonised Approach to Fight Racism and to
Promote Equal Treatment, I EUR. j. MIGRATION & I 11I, 111 (1999).
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Community-level basis to outlaw discrimination on the grounds
42
of race and ethnic origin.
The Starting Line Group drafted a proposal for a directive
in 1993, which was somewhat premature since there was no
specific legal basis whereby it could be adopted, but it was wellsupported and ultimately influenced the Commission in its
4
preparation of what became the Race Directive. 3
The
Commission's
Communication
on
Racism,
1995 44
13,
December
of
Anti-Semitism
Xenophobia and
proposed
the
insertion,
where
appropriate,
of
antidiscrimination clauses in new Community instruments and
in instruments revising and updating Community legislation.
This resulted notably in amendments to Regulation 1612/68 on
45
the free movement of workers.
Momentum for legislation grew during 1997, designated
the European Year Against Racism, which had as its objective the
raising of awareness of racism. That year also saw the
establishment of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism
and Xenophobia, 46 entrusted with the broad mandate of
gathering of information on racism and assisting in the
formulation of policy on a Community level.
These efforts culminated in the inclusion, by virtue of the
ToA, of Article 13 within the Treaty Establishing the European
Community ("EC Treaty"), which is now Article 19 of the
TFEU..4,Article 19 singles out specific grounds of discrimination
that it treats as "suspect grounds" or "suspect classifications."
The aim of Article 19 is "to protect the dignity and autonomy of
48
persons belonging to those suspect classifications."

42. See, e.g., id.
43. See Adam Tyson, The Negotiation of the European Cornrnunity Directive on Racial
Discrimnation or Ethnic Origin, 3 EUR..J. MIGRATION & L. 1999, 199-200 (2001).
44. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the
Commission on Racism, Xenophobia and Anti-Semnitisin, COM (95) 653 Final (Dec.
1995).

45. See gererally Council Regulation 1612/68/EEC on Freedom of" Movement
Within the (ommunity, sup) note 3.

46. Council Regulation No. 1035/97/E( Establishing a European Monitoring
Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 1997 O.J.I1 15 1.
47. SeeTFEU, sup a note 2. art. 19. 2010 O1. C 83, at 56.
48. Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Coleman v. Attridge Law & Steve Law,
Case C-303/06, [2008] E.C.R. 1-5603, 1 10.
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Article 19 provides a legal basis for the adoption of
measures but it does not impose any specific obligations on the
Member States, nor does it impose any obligations on the
institutions of the European Union: they have complete
discretion as to whether to act or not.49 In contrast, therefore, to
Article 18, which is concerned with the elimination of
discrimination on the grounds of nationality, it has no direct
effect in the sense that it cannot be relied upon by individuals
seeking to use it as a basis to assert the right to equal treatment.
The Agreement on Social Policy, set out in Protocol 14 to
the Maastricht Treaty, 50 enhanced the legislative competence of
the European Union in the field of social and employment
policy by broadening and increasing the use of qualified
majority voting, the European Union's lawmaking powers in the
social and employment sphere, and by empowering the
adoption of legislation in the field of equal pay.
The ToA merged the Agreement on Social Policy into the
social chapter of the EC Treaty. As a result, the legislative
competence of the Union was greatly extended. Article 119 was
renumbered Article 141 and amended to empower the adoption
of measures to ensure the application of the principle of equal
opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in
51
matters of employment and occupation including equal pay.
In the years immediately following the adoption of the ToA,
further directives were adopted, completely eliminating
discriminatory practices in the workplace legislation and
facilitating the enforcement of the principle of equality of
treatment between men and women. Directive 97/8052 codified
the Court's case law on balancing the burden of proof between
parties in gender discrimination cases5.",. The Part-Time Work

49. See Assoc. Beige des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBI. v. Conseil des
mninistres (Test-Achats), Case C-236/09. [2011] E.C.R. I
, [20-21 (delivered Mar.
1,2011) (no yet
yreported); Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Test-Achats. [20111
E.C.R. I
,4-35.
50. See Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29, 1992. 1992 O.J. C
191/1. Protocol on Social Policy, at 90-93 [hereinafter Maastricht TEU].
5 1. SeeTreaty of Amsterdam, supra note 14, art. 2(2), 1997 O.J C 340, at 24.
52. Council Directive 97/80/EC on the Burden of Proof in Cases of
Discrimination Based on Sex, 1998 0.J. L 14/6.
53. Id.pmbl. 1 18.

1438 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:1426
Directive54 and the Fixed Term Work Directive 5 were adopted
in 1997 and 1999, respectively. They aimed to eliminate
discrimination between part-time workers and full-time workers,
and between those working on fixed term contracts as compared
with those working on contracts of indefinite duration. The
Parental Leave Directive, 56 adopted in 1996, gives parents the
right to leave for the purpose of bringing up children and in
cases of o majeure
lrce relating to illness requiring the presence of
a parent.
The third phase in the evolution of EU equality law runs
from 1997-the ToA-to the present day. During this period the
Charter of Rights was adopted, the Treaty of Lisbon came into
being, and gender equality was strengthened by the adoption of
legislation outlawing discrimination on the basis of gender in
the supply of goods and services. Directives were adopted to
implement Article 13 of the EC Treaty, which after the Treaty of
Lisbon became Article 19 of the TFEU.
The Treaty of Lisbon amended the Treaty on European
Union ("TELU") and the EEC Treaty, which was (somewhat
inelegantly) renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union. By Article 6(1) of the TEU, the Charter of
Rights was given the same status as "the Treaties.' S Article 6(2)
of the TEU provides that the Union shall accede to the
European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR"). The
provisions of the ECHR on discrimination are wider than those
of the TEU or the TFELU and, should accession occur, it may
have an impact on the equality rules that govern the exercise of
Union powers. The principles of equality of treatment and
nondiscrimination are set out in Articles 2 and 3(3) of the

54. Council Directive 97/81/EC Concerning the Framework Agreincnt on PartTime Work Concluded by UNICE,CEEP and the ETUC, 1997 O.J. 1 14/9.
55. Council Directive 1999/70/EC concerning the Framework Agreeinct on
Fixed-Terim Work Concluded by ETUC,UNICE and CEEP, 1999 O:J. L 175/43.
56. Council )irective 96/34/EC on the Framework Agreement on Parental Leave
Concluded By UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, 1996 O:J. L 145/4, at 6-8 [hereinafter
Parental Leave Directive].
57. SeeTreaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Communities, 2007 O:J. ( 306/01.
58. Consolidated Version of [he Trea y on European Union art. 6(1), 2010 04. C
83/13, at 19 [hereinafter TEU post-lisbon].
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TEU, 5- and Articles 8 and 10 of the TFEU. ° Article 141 of the
EC Treaty on equal pay was renumbered Article 157 in the
TFEU and remained essentially unchanged.bl Aiticle 13 of the
EC Treaty became Article 19 of the TFEU, and was amended to
augment the role of the European Parliament in forming
measures to combat discrimination.62 Article 13 of the EC Treaty
had merely required that the European Parliament should be
consulted on proposed measures; Article 19 of the TFEU
specifies that the European Parliament should "consent" to such
measures.63
Title III of the Charter of Rights is entitled "Equality."
' 4
Article 20 provides that "[e]veryone is equal before the law."
Article 21(1) prohibits discrimination on a broader number of
grounds than Article 19 of the TFEU, namely those of "sex, race,
colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language,
religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of
a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual
orientation." 65 Article 21(2) prohibits discrimination on the
grounds of nationality "[w ] ithin the scope of application of the
Treaties and without prejudice to any of their specific
provisions. "66 Article 23 provides that "[elquality between men
and women must be ensured in all areas, including
employment, work and pay" but that "[t ] he principle of equality
shall not prevent the maintenance or adoption of measures
59. Id. art. 2, at 17 ("The Union is founded on the values of respect for human
dignity, freedom, democrac, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights,
including the rights of person belonging to minorities. These values are common to
the Member Sttes in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination. tolerance,
justice, solidarity and equality between men and women prevail."); id. art. 3(3), at 17
(stating that the Union "shall combat Social exclusion and discrimination, and shall
promote ... equality between men and women").
60. TFEU, supra note 2. art. 8, 2010 O.J. C. 83, at 53 ("In all its activities, the
Union shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equalit,, bcLween men and
wvomen."); id. art. 10, at 53 ("in defining and impleimenting its policies and activities.
the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin,
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.").
61. See id. art. 157, at 117; see also sup a note 53 and accompanying text (noting
the history of the treaty provision on equal pay).
62. TFEU, supra note 2, art. 19, 2010 OJ. ( 83, at 56.
63. Id.
64. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 20, 20 I) 0J. C
83/389, at 395 [hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights].
65. Id. art. 21 (1), at 396.
66. Id. art. 21 (2), at 396.
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providing for specific advantages in favour of the underrepresented sex." 6 7 Article 26 is concerned with the integration
of disabled persons into the community: "The Union recognises
and respects the right of persons with disabilities to benefit from
measures designed to ensure their independence, social and
occupational integration and participation in the life of the
community."68

In spite of the force of these provisions it is unclear what
their real impact will be given the constraints placed on the
scope of application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in
Article 51. Article 51(1) specifies that the provisions of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights "are addressed to institutions,
bodies, offices and agencies of the Union... and to the
Member States only when they are implementing Union law. '("'
The second paragraph of the same provision states that the
"Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law
beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power or
task for the Union, or modify powers or tasks as defined in the
Treaties."70
In the Explanations to the Charter of Fundamental Rights
it is stated that Article 21 (1) does not "alter the extent of powers

granted under TFEU Article 19 nor the interpretation given to
that Article,"1 as "Article 19 confers power on the Union to
adopt legislative acts." 72 Article 21(1) of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights "does not create any power to enact antidiscrimination laws... it only addresses discrimination by the
institutions and bodies of the Union themselves, when
exercising powers under the Treaties, and by the Member States
' 7
when they are implementing Union law. 3

Id. art. 23, at 396.
Id. art. 26, at 397
Id. art. 51, at 402.
Id.
71. Explanations to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2007 ().J. C 303/17, at 24.
72. Id.
73. See Evelyn Ellis, The Impat of the Lisbon Treaty on Gen der Equalit,. EUR. GENDER
EQUALITY I. RFV.,June 2010, at 7, 10-11. See genr(@- Sophia Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulos,
The Lisbon Trea , and the Charter of FundatentalRights: aintainingand Developing the
Acquis in Gender Equali,, EUR. G( ND. EoUAL. L. RLEV., Aug. 2008, at 15 (noting the
Treaty of Lisbon's impact on the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights).
67.
68.
69.
70.
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11. NATIOVALITY DISCRIMINA TION\
Although Article 7 of the EEC,now Article 18 of the TFEU,

empowered the adoption of rules designed to prohibit
nationality discrimination, none have ever been adopted.
Instead, the law on nationality discrimination has been
developed by the cj.
The earliest cases involving claims of equal treatment on
the basis of nationality started to come before the CJ in the early
1980s. They concerned the right of equality of treatment
between nationals and nonnationals with respect to conditions
of access to education. In Forcheri v.Belgium, the Court ruled
that "although educational and vocational training policy is not
as such part of the areas which the Treaty has allotted to the
competence of the Community institutions" the Treaty did, in
Article 128, empower the European Union Council ("Council")
to "lay down general principles for implementing a common
vocational training policy. ''74 Such a policy had been laid down
in a Council decision adopted in 1963. 75 Consequently,
conditions of access to education have to be the same for
nationals and nonnationals alike. In Gravier v. City of Li~e,
decided some two years later, the CJ held that Ms. Gravier, a
French national, who wished to study the art of strip cartoon
(for which the Belgians are well known), could not be required

74. Forcheri v.Belgium, Case 152/82, [1983] E.C.R. 2323, It 14, 17.
75. Council Decision No. 63/266/EE(, 1963 0J.L 1338/63. Consequently, ifa
Member State organized vocational training courses Article 18 prohibited it f-omn

requiring an enrollment lee to be paid by nationals where such a lee was not payable by
its own nationals. Subsequent case law clarified the ilcaning of vocational training.
Gravier v. Cih, of Liege, Case 293/83, [1985] E.C.R. 593, 1 30, held that "any torn of
education which prepares for a qualification for a particular profession, trade or
employment or which provides the necessar training and skills
tor such a profcssion,
trade or cmploymeLlnt isvocational training, whatever the age and the level of training
of the pupils or students." Some years alter Gr(vier, the Court in Blaizot v. 1rnversity of
Liege, Case 24/86, [1988] E.C.R. 379. further refined itsthinking on the issue, giving
vocational training a broad interpreLtation. The tern now included not only studies
where the final academic examinations directly provide the required qualification for a
particular profcssion, trade, or cmploymeLnt, but also those studies that equip a person
with the knowledge needed tor the pursuit of a profcssion. trade, or elployment. Id.
19. In general university studies fulfilled these criteria, the only exception being
certain courses of study which, because of their particular nature, are intended tor
persons wishing to improve their general knowledge rather than prepare themselves
for an occupation." Id.1 20.
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to pay a fee (the "minerval") that was not levied on Belgian
7
students. 6
Subsequently, the CJ extended the principle of equality
between nationals broadly into other areas. In Cowan v. Le Trdsor
Pblic,77 a UK national was attacked violently outside a metro
station in Paris. The cJ held that, as a recipient of services, he
fell within the scope of Article 18 and was thus entitled under
French law to compensation for victims of violent crimes on the
same terms as French nationals.
Cowan marked the beginning of a period that has lasted
until this day of broadly using what is now Article 18 of the
TFEU to achieve equality of treatment among Community
citizens. As we have seen above, the Gravier line of case law
established the principle of equal rights in access to education.
Data Delecta Aktiebolag v. MLSL Dynamics Ltd. held that a foreign
plaintiff who was not a resident in Sweden could not be required
to provide security to guarantee payment of costs of judicial
proceedings where Swedish nationals were not subject to such a
requirement.7 8 Pastoors v. BelgiuM79 accepted that while it was
justifiable for Belgian law to require a nonnational, who did not
reside permanently in Belgium, and who was accused of a
criminal offense to pay a deposit to cover the eventual cost of
fines and legal expenses, the Court found the level of the
deposit in question to be disproportionately high. In Bickel &
Franz,80 the Court held that Article 6 requires a Member State
that grants residents in a part of its territory the right to use a
language other than its official language in criminal
proceedings to extend that right to nonnationals. In Garcia
Avello v. Belgium,8 1 the CJ affirmed the right of nonnationals to
exceptional treatment under national law in order to respect the
rights attaching to their nationality. Under Belgian law, children
bear the name of their father. By contrast, in Spain children
carry the name of both parents. Mr. Garcia Avello wanted his

76. Gravie , [1985] E.C.R. 593, 1 5-6, 26.
77. Cowan v. Lc Trdsor Public, Case C-186/87, [1989] E.C.R. 195, IT 2. 17- 20.
78. Data Delccta Akticbolag v. MSL Dynamics Ltd., Case C-43/95, [1996] E.C.R. I4661,
33, 22.
79. Pastoors v. Belgium, Case C-29/95. [1997] E.C.R. 1-285. 28.
80. Bickcl & Franz v. Ihaly, Case C-274/96. [1998] E.C.R. 1-7637, 1[ 31.
8 1. Garcia Avello v. Belgium, Case C-1 48/02, [2003] E.C.R. 1-1303 1.
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children to have the surname Garcia Weber, Weber being his
wife's maiden name. Belgian law did not allow for such a
possibility. The Cj held that this rule was discriminatory in the
sense it treated children in dissimilar situations in the same way:
that children with dual nationality were treated in the same
manner children of Belgian nationality. Such treatment could
have practical consequences in their private and professional
lives.
The European citizen came into being with the adoption of
the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.8 2 It is within the sphere of
European citizenship that Article 18 has played a most
important role giving meaning and substance to a vaguely
worded provision, the meaning and content of which were
unclear. Citizenship of the European Union has been
proclaimed to be "destined to be the fundamental status of
83
nationals of the Member States."1
The extent and scope of the rights of the European citizen
began to be developed by the Cj in the seminal case of Martfnez
Sala v. Freistaat Bayern.8 4 Mrs. Martfnez Sala was a Spanish
national who had lived and work for some years in Germany.
She had had successive residence permits and at the relevant
time had applied for a renewal of her permit. She claimed a
child raising allowance. This was refused on the ground that she
did not have a residence permit as her application for its
renewal was still being processed. She lawfully resided in
Germany in the sense that she could not be deported. The case,
according to the German authorities, turned on whether Mrs.
Martfnez Sala was a worker. The Court, however, took the view
that even if Mrs. Martfnez Sala was not a worker, she was a
European citizen as she was a national of a Member State
lawfully residing on the territory of another Member State. She
could therefore rely on Article 18.
Mart ez Sala marked a huge leap in the thinking of the
Court on Article 18-it signaled that Article 18 could be used as
a source of rights for the European citizen within its scope of
application. It marked the beginning of an era in which the
82.
83.
184/99,
84.

Maastricht TEU, supra note 50, art. 8, 1992 ().J. C 191, at 7.
Grzelczyk v. Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignics-Louvain-la-Neuve, Case C,
[2001] E.C.R. 1-6193. 31.
Martfnez Sala v Freisuat Bayern, Case C-85/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-2691.
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Court endowed the European citizen with a substantive body of
rights, thereby giving life to what can only be described as a fetus
(albeit with a constitutional pedigree).
Martinez Sala appeared, at first sight, to state
unconditionally that lawful residence generates entitlement to
all socioeconomic rights within the scope of the EU legal order
and this was believed to be the case for some time. However, it is
important to view this case against its factual background: Mrs.
Martfnez Sala did have a long standing connection with
Germany, from whose authorities she sought a child raising
allowance, having lived there since the age of twelve and having
been employed at substantial intervals. Even if the Court in
Martinez Sala did intend, as its wording would suggest, to give all
persons lawfully in the territory of a Member State entitlement
to EU socioeconomic rights, it has moved away from this stance
in subsequent case law.
Grzelczyk v. Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-laVeuve, 15 D'Hoop v. OJJice national de 1'emploi, 81 and Bidar v.
London Borough of Ealing8 7 established that entitlement to
benefits and loans from a Member State on the same terms as
nationals of that State was dependent on the claimant having a

link with that State, an issue to be determined by the
circumstances of each case.
In Trojani v. Centre public d'aide sociale de Bruxelles,8 the
Court held that the exercise of the right to free movement is not
unconditional but is subject to the limitations set out in EU law.
A right to reside in a Member State does not flow automatically
from Article 18 of the EC Treaty, now Article 19 of the TFEU,
but is dependent upon the fulfillment of the various conditions
laid down both in the Treatv itself and secondary legislation.
However, once a person was lawfully resident in a Member State,
he or she had the right to be treated equally with nationals of
that State and could rely on Article 18 to claim a social assistance
benefit.

85. Grzelczy7 [2001] E.C.R. 1-6193.
86. 1)'Hoop v.Olice national de 'ernploi, Case C-224/98, [2002] E.C.R. I6191.
87. Bidar v. London Borough of Ealing, Case C-209/03. [2005] E.C.R. 1-2119.
88. Trojani v. Centre public d'aidc socialc de Bruxclles, Case C-456/02. [2004]
E.C.R. 1-7573.
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Collins v. SecretaUy of State for Work & Pensions 9 went further
than Tr'ojani in that the Court found that although the claimant
(who was of dual American-Irish citizenship) was lawfully
resident in the United Kingdom and that the job seekers
allowance that he claimed was within the scope of the EC Treaty,
it was legitimate for the United Kingdom to grant such an
allowance only after it was possible to establish that a genuine
link existed between the person seeking work and the

employment market of that State. Such a link may be
determined in particular by establishing that the person
concerned has, for a reasonable period, genuinely sought work
in the Member State in question.
The position at present seems to be that lawful residence
alone will not bring entitlement to equal treatment of social
welfare and related rights funded by the host State. Some
further link with the host State is necessary to engender the
solidarity that warrants support from the citizens of that State. 90
And that is surely right.
The Equal Pay Directive, the Equal Opportunities Directive,
and the Burden of Proof Directive were repealed and replaced
with effect on August 15, 2009 by the Recast Directive. 91 The
Equal Treatment in Social Security Directive, the Pregnancy
Directive, the Parental Leave Directive, the Goods and Services
Directive, and the Equal Treatment for the Self-Employed
Directive 92 make up the full complement of legislation dealing
with gender discrimination.
89. Collins v. Sec'y of State for Work & Pensions, Case C-138/02, [2004] E.C.R.

1-2703.
90. The "link principle" has been reCently confirmed by the Court of Justice
or "Court") in Stewart v. Sec's ofStatefor Work & Pensions, Case (-503/09, [2011] E.C.R.
I
(delivered July 21, 2011) (not yet reported). See generally Charlotte O'Brien, Real
Links, Abstract Rights and False Alarms: The Relationship Between the ECJ's 'Real Lirnk" Case
Law and NationalSolidarit,. 33 EUR. L. RLV. 643 (2008).
91. See Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on
thc inplementation of the Principle of Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment of
Men and Women in MattCrs of Employmnent and Occupation (Recast), 2006 OJ. .
204/23, art. 34, at 33 [hereinalter Recast Directive].
92. Equal Treatment in Social Security Directive, supra note 29; Pregnancy
Directive, supra note 34; Parental Leave Directive, supra note 56; Council Directive
2004/113iEC Implementing the principle of Equal Treatnent Bewecen Men and
Women in the Access to and Supply of Goods and Services, 2004 ().J. L 373/37
[hereinafter Goods and Services Directive]; Directive 2010/4l/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the Application of the Principle of Equal Treaunent
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Two other directives have been adopted pursuant to Article
19 of the TFEU: first, the Race Directive-hand second, the
94
Framework Employment Directive.
III. THE LEGISLATVE LAVDSCAPE: PRINCIPAL FEA TURES
At the outset it should be noted that some aspects are
common to all directives, for example the definition of direct
and indirect discrimination, forms of discrimination and certain
principles, and mechanisms relating to enforcement. In other
respects the directives differ, leading to a fragmentation in the
application of the principle of equal treatment regarded by
some as regrettable and unnecessary,95 but by the Commission as
inevitable given the differing characteristics of the various
grounds of discrimination. 96 The (4 has, in general, been
consistent in its approach to common issues, transposing
principles established in one domain of antidiscrimination to
others. Yet there is a marked difference in the rigor of its
approach to exceptions and derogations, with a generosity of
spirit shown in favor of the Member States when determining
their social and employment policy with respect to some types of
discrimination, notably age, which is denied in others, for
example, gender discrimination.
The directives impose minimum standards only: Member
States are free to adopt more favorable provisions if they wish.
The directives, however, should not serve to justif- any

Between Men and Women Engaged in an Activity in a SelftEmployed Capacity, 2010
O. L 180/1 [hereinafter Equal Treatment for the Self Employed Directive].
93. Council Directive 2000/43/E( Implementing the Principle of Equal
Treatment Between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin, 2000 O.J. I 180/22
[hereinafter Race Directive].
94. Council Directive 2000/78/E( Establishing a General Framework tor Equal
Treatment in Employnent and Occupation, 2000 O1. L 303/16 [hereinalter
Framework Employment Directive].
95. See Mark Bell & Lisa Waddington, Reflecting on Equalities in European Equality
Law, 28(3) EUR. I. REV. 349, 350-51 (2003); ILisa Waddington & Mark Bell, More Equal
than Others: DistinguishingEuropean Union Directives, 38 COMMON MKT. L. RLV. 587, 590

(2001).
96. See Commission of the European Communities, Non-Discrimination and
Equal Opportunities: A Renewed Commitment, COM (2008) 420 Final, at 5, [ 2.2 (>y
2008) ("The various grounds of discrimination differ substantively, and each demands

a tailored response.").
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regression in standards prevailing at the time of its adoption.
They are thus measures of upward harmonization.
All directives prohibit direct and indirect discrimination,
concepts developed by the cJ in its case law and subsequently
transposed into legislation. Direct discrimination is defined as
the treatment of one person less favorably on one of the
prohibited grounds with which the legislation is concerned (sex,
racial or ethnic origin, age, religion, disability, or sexual
orientation) than another person would be treated in
comparable circumstances. 97 Indirect discrimination occurs
where an apparently neutral provision, criterion, or practice
would put persons bearing certain characteristics at a particular
disadvantage compared with persons who do not possess those
characteristics, unless such differential treatment can be
objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of
achieving that aim are proportionate. Discrimination also
includes harassment and, where relevant, sexual harassment and
instructions to discriminate. " Less favorable treatment of
women who are pregnant or on maternity leave is also
prohibited. 100 Positive action to ensure full equality is permitted
both under Article 157(4) of the TFEU, the Recast Directive,
and the Race Directive. 1 1 The directives are all expressed to
apply both in the public and private sectors and to employment
in public bodies-thus they cover all types of remunerated
activity.
Vith respect to enforcement, the picture is somewhat
mixed. There are some common features in the directives and at
the same time there are differences that result in a higher level
of protection against discrimination in some areas but not
others.
Laws, regulations, or administrative provisions that are
contrary to the principle of equal treatment are required to be
abolished. Member States are required to make null and void,
have declared null and void, or subject to the obligation to
97. See, e.g., Race Directive, supra note 93, art. 2(2) (a), at 24.

98. See, e.g., id. aft. 2(2)(b), at 24.
99. See, e.g-, Goods and Services Directive, supra note 92, art. 1, at 40.
100. See Pregnancy Directive, supra note 34, art. 10. at 4.
101. See TFEU, supra nOte 2, art. 157(4), 2010 OJ. C 83, at 117: Recast Directive.
supra note 91, art. 3, at 27; Race Directive, supra note 93, art. 5, at 24.
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amend, any provisions contrary to the principle of equal
treatment that are in individual contracts, collective agreements,
internal rules of undertakings, rules governing profit-making or
non-profit-making organizations, and rules governing the
independent professions and workers'
and employers'
organizations. Thus, directives impose on the Member States the
duty to render their provisions effective right across the entire
spectrum of those aspects of economic and social life with which
it is concerned.
Judicial or administrative remedies must be made available
to all persons who consider themselves to have been the subject
of discriminatory acts. These remedies must be available even if
the relationship within which the unequal treatment is alleged
to have occurred has ended. The right to bring proceedings
extends to associations, organizations, or other legal entities that
have a legitimate interest in ensuring compliance with the
directives. Member States may determine which groups have a
legitimate interest.
Sanctions for breach of national provisions adopted to
implement the directives must be put in place by the Member
States. Such sanctions, which may include the payment of

compensation, must be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive.
Apart from granting the claimant the right to bring
proceedings for the enforcement of the principle of equal
treatment, the directives institute a number of other
enforcement mechanisms, aimed at the prevention of
discriminatory conduct. First, they advocate the dissemination of
information relating to the provisions of the directive within the
Member States. Secondly, they advocate fostering equal
treatment in the workplace through social dialogue. Thirdly,
they require Member States to encourage dialogue with
appropriate nongovermental organizations. Lastly, with the
notable exception of the Framework Equality Directive, Member
States are required to designate a body responsible for the
promotion of equal treatment. Such bodies must be competent
to provide independent assistance to victims of discrimination in
the pursuit of their complaints, to conduct independent surveys,
and to make public reports and recommendations on any issue
relating to discrimination.
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Where a claim for equal treatment requires a claimant to
adduce factual evidence, the burden of proving that such
evidence does not show unequal treatment shifts to the
respondent who must prove that there has not been any
discrimination. The plaintiff must simply provide evidence from
which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination.
Generally this rule does not apply to criminal proceedings or
proceedings in which it is for a court or competent body to
investigate the case. Thus in Coleman v. Attridge Law, 102where
harassment due to associative disability was alleged, the Court
held that should Ms. Coleman establish facts from which it could
be presumed that there has been harassment, the effective
application of the principle of equal treatment requires that that
the burden of proof should fall upon the respondents to prove
that there has been no harassment in the circumstances of the
case.
IV. GENDER DISCRI1MINA TION

Article 157 of the TFEU, as we have seen, provides for equal
pay for work of equal value. In addition to this provision, which
is limited to pay, there are currently six directives dealing with
gender discrimination: the Recast Directive, 110.the Equal
Treatment in Social Securitv Directive, 114 the Pregnancy
Directive, 105 the revised Parental Leave Directive ("Parental
Leave Directive II"), I % the Equal Treatment for the SelfEmployed Directive,11 7 and the Goods and Services Directive. 0 s
All except one are concerned with employment-related
discrimination. In addition to these six directives there is a vast
body of case law on gender discrimination stretching back over
forty years. The principles established by these cases have, to a
large extent, been reflected both in treaty amendments, the

102. Coleman v.Attridge Law & Steve Law. Case (-303/06, [2008] E.C.R. 1-5603.
103. Recast Directive, supra note 91.
104. Equal Treatment in Social Security Directive, supra note 29.
105. Pregnancy Directive, supra note 34.
106. Council Directive 2010/18/1U Implementing the Revised Framework
Agreement on Parental Leave Concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAMME, CEEP and
ETUC and Repealing Directive 96/34/EC, 20 10 0.J. L 68/13.
107. Equal Treatment for the Sell-Employed Directive, Supra note 92.
108. Goods and Services Directive, supra note 92.
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Recast Directive, and recent amendments to the Parental Leave
Directive and the Equal Treatment for the Self-Employed
Directive. While many of the directives have common features,
there are differences between them necessitated by the
circumstances to which they are addressed.
Let us now consider each of the directives briefly. The
Recast Directive repeals and replaces four directives adopted
between 1975 and 1997 dealing with equal pay, equal
opportunities, equality of treatment in occupational social
security systems, and the burden of proof in cases of
discrimination based on sex. It reflects and incorporates the
significant body of case law interpreting and applying those
directives. Its provisions implement the principle to equal
treatment in relation to: "(a) access to employment, including
promotion, and to vocational training; (b) working conditions,
19
including pay; (c) occupational social security schemes." 0
"Pay" is defined as "the ordinary basic or minimum wage or
salary and any other consideration, whether in cash or in kind,
which the worker receives directly or indirectly, in respect of
his/her employment form his/her an employer." I10 This
definition reflects the generous interpretation given to the

concept of pay developed by the cJ in the years since DejrenneII
and the earlier Equal Pay Directive. Neither Article 119 of the
EEC Treaty nor the latter directive defined pay, so it was left to
the Cg to elaborate. The Cg did so by relying on the link between
monies received by the employee and his employment." It
considered whether the employee received the sum in question
as a direct result of his contract of employment or employment
relationship.
Article 119 refers to equal pay for equal work. Worringham
v. Lloyds Bank Ltd. interpreted the concept of "equal work" in
Article 119 as including work of equal value.' 2 JI1wrpyh v. Bord
Telecom Eireann went further, holding that Article 119 could be
relied upon when a group of women were engaged in work of
higher value than that of the men to whom they compare
themselves. The women in question were employed as factory
109.
110.
111.
112.

Recast Directive, supra note 91, art. 1, at 26.
Id. art. 3, at 27.
Garland v. Briish Rail Eng'g Ltd.. Case 12/81, [1982] E.C.R. 359. 5.
Worringhan v. l.loyds Bank ltd., Case 69/80, [1981] E.C.R. 767, 21.

2012]

1451

EQUALITY BETWEEN EUROPE'S CITIZENS

workers. Theirjobs were found to have a higher value than store
laborers. The Court found that they were entitled to compare
themselves to men in order to claim their equal pay rights.1
McCarthys Ltd. v. Smith concerned the question of at which point
in time jobs could be compared. The Court held that the
concept of "equal work" could not be constrained by a
requirement of contemporaneity. Thus a female employee
could claim parity of pay with her male predecessor even if he
had vacated the employment before she was hired. The Court
gave no indication as to whether there was any temporal limit on
4
the period during which such a comparison could be made."
The issue has not been raised subsequently.
Discrimination on the ground of sex is prohibited in
relation to:
(a) conditions for access to employment, to selfemployment or to occupation, including selection criteria
and recruitment conditions, whatever the branch of activity
and at all levels of the professional hierarchy, including
promotion;
(b) access to all types and to all levels of vocational
guidance, vocational training, advanced vocational training
and retraining, including practical work experience;
(c) employment and working conditions, including
dismissals ...
(d) membership of, and involvement in, an organisation of
workers or employers, or any organisation whose members
carry on a particular profession, including the benefits
provided for by such organisations."15
A difference of treatment based on a characteristic related to sex
may be permitted by the Member States "where, by reason of the
particular occupational activities concerned or the context in
which they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a
genuine and determining occupational requirement, provided
that its objective is legitimate and the requirement is
proportionate. "1 A woman on maternity leave is entitled after

113.
114.
115.
116.

Murphy v. Bord Telecom Eireann, Case 157/86, [1988] E.C.R. 673,
Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith, Case 129/79. [1980] E.C.R. 1275, [ 7.
Recast Directive, supra note 91, art. 14(1), at 30.
Id. art. 14(2), at 30.

9.
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the expiry of that period of leave "to return to her job or to an
equivalent post on terms and conditions which are no less
favorable to her and to benefit from any improvement in
working conditions to which she would have been entitled
during her absence." 11 7 The same guarantees must be made
available where a Member State recognizes the right to paternity
or adoption leave to those availing themselves of such leave."'
Chapter 2 of the Recast Directive contains a number of
provisions relating to occupational social security schemes.
These provisions reflect the principles established by the cJ in
the wake of Barber v. GuardianRoval Exchange Assurance Group.''
Discrimination is prohibited with respect to the scope of
occupational social security schemes, the conditions of access to
them, contribution obligations and rates, and the calculation of
benefits.121 Employed or self-employed persons "whose activity is
interrupted by illness, maternity, accident or involuntary
unemployment... persons seeking employment... retired or
disabled workers, and to those claiming under them [family
members]" are covered in respect of five types of risk: sickness,
invalidity, old age (including early retirement), industrial
12
accidents and occupational diseases, and unemployment.
Schemes in which there is no employer involvement are
excluded.122 Eleven specific examples are given in Article 9 of
provisions in occupational social security schemes that are
deemed to be contrary to the principle of equal treatment.23
"Where men and women may claim a flexible pensionable age
under the same conditions," this is not to be regarded as
124
incompatible with the principle of equal treatment.
The Equal Treatment in Social Security Directive provides
that there should be no discrimination, either direct or indirect,
on the grounds of sex with respect to the scope of the social
security schemes to which the directive relates: payment
117.
118.
119.
1889.
120.
121.
122.

Id. art. 15, at 30.
Id. art. 16, at 30.
Barber v. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance Grp., C-262/88, [1990] E.C.R. I-

Recast Directive, supra note 91, art. 5, at 27.
Id. art 6, at 27.
Id. art. 8, at 28.
123. See id. art. 9, at 28-29.
124. Id. art. 13, at 29.
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obligations, rates of contribution, or the calculation of
benefits1 25 The directive applies without prejudice to provisions
relating to the protection of women on the grounds of
maternity. 126
As per Article 3, the directive applies to statutory schemes
relating to classic risks such as: sickness, invalidity, old age, work
accidents, occupational diseases, and unemployment. 127 The
directive also applies to social assistance programs designed to
supplement or replace social security benefits. ,2 It covers the
working population, which includes employed and selfemployed individuals, in addition to those whose activity has
been interrupted by one of the risks specified in Article 3. The
Cg has interpreted the concept of "working population" broadly
to include those who are working and seeking employment as
well as those temporarily out of the labor market by reason of
one of the risks set out in Article 3.1 29 The essential criterion is
that the person in question must be normally in the labor
market or seeking actively to enter it. ",1 The Cg has been
generous with regard to the length of time a person can be
absent from the labor market without losing status as a member
of the working population. 131
The directive is not confined to the prohibition of
discrimination on the grounds of sex; it also applies in the case
1 32
of gender reassignment.
Article 4 defines the principle of equal treatment.'133 Both
direct and indirect discrimination are prohibited. In McDermott

125. Equal Treatment in Social Security Directive, supra note 29, art.4( l), at 25.
126. Id. art 4(2), at 25.
127. Id. art. 3(1)(a), at 24
128. Id. art. 3(l)(b), at 24.
129. Id. art. 2, at 24.
130. A person who has never worked for remuneration cannot be considered a
member of the working population even if such a person is providing service to a family
incinber that would be remunerated if provided by a third party. See Zichner v.
Handelskrankenkasse (Ersatzkasse) Bremen, Case C-77/95, [1996] E.C.R.
1[5689.16.
131. See Nolte v. Landesversicherungsanstalt Hannover, Case C-317/ 93, [1995]
E.C.R. 1-3723; Johnson v. Chief Adjudication Officer, Case C-410/92. [1994] E.( R. 15483.
132. S., Richards v. Sec'y of State for Work & Pensions, Case C-423/04, [2006]
E.C.R. 1-385: K.B. v. Nat'l Health Sciv. Pensions Agency, Case C117/01. [2004] E.C.R.
1-541.
133. Equal Treatment in Social Security Directive, supra note 29, art. 4, at 25.
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& Cotter v. MinisterJor Social Wel(are, the CJ found that paying
different rates of unemployment benefits to men and women
violated the principle of equal treatment.1 4 Teuling v. Bestuur
van de Bedrijfsverenigingvoor de Chemische Industri 5 concerned a
system of supplements for incapacitated workers that were
calculated based not on the claimant's sex, but rather on his or
her marital status or family situation. The result was that
considerably fewer women than men were entitled to such
supplements. The CJ found this to be discriminatory and
contrary to the provisions of the directive unless objectively
justified. The cJ found in its early case law on the directive that
Article 4(1), which lays down the principle of equal treatment,
to have direct effect. It is by virtue of this quality that equal
treatment has largely been achieved, given the fact that even
after a six-year implementation period, many Member States
had not taken steps to transpose the directive into their national
legal systems.
Shortly after the directive's implementation date, women
began to invoke it to claim equal treatment before their national
social security authorities and courts. Uncertain of whether and
if so, how, in practical terms, equality of treatment could derive
directly from the directive, courts made a number of
preliminary rulings to the cJ that took a robust view of the
effects of the directive.

Netherlands v. Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging was the first
case to come before the Court on the issue of the directive's
direct effect.1 36 It concerned a provision of the Dutch law on
unemployment benefits. The relevant provision excluded from
entitlement to benefits married female workers who lived with

their husbands, on the grounds that they were not the main
breadwinners. This provision remained in force after December
23, 1984 when the directive came into effect. FNV, the Dutch
Trades Union Federation, brought an action alleging that the

134. See McDermott & CottLer v. Minister tor Soc. Welfare, Case 286/85, [1987]
E.C.R. 1453.
135. Teuling v. Bestimur van de Bedrijisvereniging voor de Chemische I11dustrie,
Case 286/85. [1987] E.C.R. 1453.
136. Netherlands v. Federatic Nederlandse Vakbeweging, Case 71/85, [1986]
E.C.R. 3855.
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Dutch government had acted unlawfully in maintaining this
provision in force after that date.
McDermott & Cotter concerned a claim by two Irish women
alleging breach of the principle of equal treatment in the Irish
unemployment benefit scheme. Both the duration for which
benefits were paid and the rate of benefits were less than those
awarded to men under similar circumstances. The directive had
13
not been implemented in Ireland. ,
Both cases raised the issue of whether reliance could be
placed on Article 4(1) to claim equal treatment. The cJ found
that provision to be directly effective:
[S]tanding by itself, and in the light of the objective and
contents of the directive, Article 4(1) is sufficiently precise

to be relied upon in legal proceedings and applied by a
court. Moreover, that article in no way permits Member
States to restrict or place conditions on the application of
the principle of equal treatment in its particular area of

application .... It follows from the foregoing that Article
4(1) is sufficiently precise and unconditional to allow
individuals, in the absence of implementing measures, to
rely upon it before national courts as from 23 December
1984, in order to preclude the application of any national
provision inconsistent with that article.1 8
In subsequent proceedings brought by Mrs. McDermott
and Mrs. Cotter, the Court ruled that in the absence of any
implementing legislation, the principle of equal treatment as set
out in the directive meant that women must be paid the same
benefits as men. 9 Thus, in a single stroke, the directive gave
rise to real and enforceable rights.
The directive contains a number of exceptions and
permitted derogations from its provisions. It neither applies to
occupational social security schemes, nor to family and
survivors' benefits. Member States are allowed to derogate from
the principle of nondiscrimination with respect to a number of
old age benefits. These derogations generally concern

137. See McDermott &, Cotter. [1987] ECR 1453.
138. Id. 14 (lollowing the holding in Netheards v. Federatie Vederande
Vakbewzeging).
139. See Cotter & McDermno[t v. Minister for Soc.Wcltare, Case C-377/89, [1991]

E.C.R. 1-1155.
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advantages given to women but denied to men in the same
circumstances. The CJ has found that "the legislature intended
to allow the Member States to maintain temporarily the
advantages accorded to women in order to enable them to adapt
their schemes progressively without disrupting the complex
financial equilibrium of those systems." 40 These derogations
41
have been interpreted restrictively by the cJ.1
The Equal Treatment for the Self-Employed Directive
applies the principle of equal treatment to the self-employed,
thus extending that principle to all those in economic activity,
regardless of their status. 142 It also extends to spouses of the selfemployed or life partners (recognized as such by national law)
who are "contributing to the pursuit of such an activity," insofar
as such persons and their circumstances are not covered by the
Equality of Treatment in Social Security Directive or the Goods
and Services Directive. Such persons may not be employees or
business partners but may be actively engaged in the business
activity of the self-employed person.
Where a Member State has a system of social protection for
the self-employed, it may provide that such protection should
extend to spouses or life partners on a "mandatory or voluntary

basis." 43 Member States must take the necessary measures to
ensure that the female self-employed and female spouses and
life partners have the right, either on a mandatory or voluntary
basis,
to a
"sufficient maternity
allowance
enabling
interruptions" to their activity for reason of pregnancy or
motherhood for at least fourteen weeks.144 Article 8(3) sets out
45
the method for calculating this allowance. 1
140. Richards v.Sec'y of State tor Work & Pensions. Case C-423/04, [2006] E.C.R.
1-3585, 35; seeEx parte Equal Opportunities Commission, Case C-9/91, [1992] E.C.R.
1-4297. Although ostensibly tempori y,these derogations are of an indefinite duration.
As such, these derogations' validil- appears questionable following the March 1, 2011
judgment in Test-Achats. See geraerll 3 Philippa Watson, Equality, FurdamertalRights and
theLimit ofLegislative Discretio. Co men on Test-Achats, 36 EUR. L. REV.896 (2011).
141. See Brachner v. PensionsversichrungsanstaL, Case C-123/10. [2011] E.(.R.
1
(delivered Oct. 11, 2011) (not yet reported); Ex parteJohn Henry Taylor, Case C382/98, [1999] E.(.R. 1-8955; Sec'y of State tor Soc. Security v.Thomas, Case C-328/91.
[1993] E.C.R. 1-1247.
142. Equal Treatment for the Self-Employed Directive, supra note 92.
143. Id. art. 7, at 4.
144. Id.art. 8(1), at 4.
145. Id.art. 8(3), at4.
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The Pregnancy Directive is designed to promote the welfare
1 4
of pregnant workers and those who have recently given birth. 6
Such women are viewed as a particularly vulnerable group of
workers, given the potential health risks to their children and
themselves in certain workplace environments. The directive
provides for a minimum fourteen weeks of maternity leave,
during which new mothers must receive an allowance. 1 47 The
directive prohibits pregnant women from performing night
work, and stipulates that pregnant women may not be exposed
to certain substances and materials. 14, Where a work
environment poses a risk to a pregnant woman, employers are
required to obviate such risk by changing her job or, if
necessary, giving her leave from work. 149 The directive applies to
pregnant workers who have informed their employer of their
pregnancy.
In Kiiski v. Tampereen Kaupuki,150 the question arose as to
whether the directive applied to a woman who claimed
maternity leave and was not actually working when she became
pregnant because she was on child care leave looking after
another child. The woman was therefore not in a position when
she was exposed to risks in the workplace. The CJ held, however,
that the directive was applicable in such a situation. The
provisions of the directive did not make the right to leave
subject to the condition that the pregnant woman should
actually be in a situation where she was exposed to risks. The
worker, therefore, could not be denied rights under the
directive because, when she became pregnant, she had left her
job temporarily to enjoy another period of leave to which she
was entitled. Jlar v. Backerei ud Konditorei Gerhard Flikkner
OHG1 51 held that a woman undergoing in vitro fertilisation

146. See Pregnancy

Directive,

supra

note 34.

147. See id.
art. 11, at 4. This allowance isnot to be regarded as pay and need not
relate to normal levels of pa. See Gassmayr v. Bundesmninister fur Wissenschaft und
Forschung, Case C-194/08, [2010] E.C.R. 1-6277; Parvianinen v. Oyj, Case C-471/08,
[2010] E.C.R.1-6529.
148. See Pregnancy Directive, supanote 34, arts. 6-7. at 3-4.
149. Id.art. 5,at 4.
150. Kiiski v.Tamprcern Kaupunki, Case C-116/06, [2007] E.C.R. 1-7643. [58.
151. Mayr v. Backerci und Konditorci Gerhard FlCckncr OHG, Case (-506/06,
[2008] E.C.R. 1-1017, 1 41.
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could not be regarded as pregnant if her ova had not been
transferred to her uterus.
The Goods and Senices Directive 152 marks the first directive
on gender discrimination outside the sphere of employment
and employment-related matters. The purpose of the directive,
as stated in Article 1, is to lay down a framework for combating
discrimination based on sex in the access to and supply of goods
and services. Its legal basis lies in Article 19 of the TFEU.
Differences in treatment between men and women may- be
allowed if the provision of goods or services exclusively or
primarily to members of one sex is justified by a legitimate aim
and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and
necessary.
The directive as expressed does not apply in the areas of
employment and occupation or to matters of self-employment,
insofar as such matters are covered by other EU legislative acts.
It does not cover education, media content, or advertising. It
applies to all persons, both in the public and private sector, who
provide services that are available to the public and that "are
offered outside the area of private or family life."' 153 In addition
to these generally applicable exceptions, Article 5(2) permits
the Member States to derogate from the provisions of Article
5 (1), which prohibits all new insurance contracts concluded
after December 21, 2007, and to use sex as a factor in the
calculation of premiums and benefits. Article 5(2) states that
Member States may decide before December 21, 2007 "to
permit proportionate differences in individuals' premiums and
benefits where the use of sex is a determining factor in the
assessment of risk based on relevant and accurate actuarial and
statistical data."154 In Association Beige des Consommateurs TestAchats ASBL v. Conseil des ministres (" Test-Achats") 155 the CJ found
Article 5(2) to be invalid. The possibility of the Member States

maintaining for an undefined period of time-possibly
indefinitely-an exemption from the requirement in Article
5(1) of unisex premiums and benefits, was contrary to the
152. Goods and Services Directive, supra note 92.

153. Id.art. 3 (1), at 40.
154. Id. art. 5(2), at 41
155. Test-Achats. Case C-236/09, [2011] E.C.R. I
2011 ) (not yet reported).

,

34 (delivered Mar. 1.
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principle of equal treatment, and must therefore be regarded as
invalid "upon the expiry of an appropriate transitional period,"
which the Cj laid down as ending on December 21, 2012. 56; The
Commission issued a Communication in December 2011, setting
out guidelines aimed at facilitating compliance by the insurance
industry with this ruling. 57
V. THE RACE DIRECTIVE
The Race Directive158 was adopted on June 6, 2000. It was
fast tracked through the legislative process achieving final
adoption in a record six-month period. The speed with which
the proposal was adopted can be attributed to three factors.
First, the lengthy period of preparation prior to the
introduction of the proposal that dated back to, and gathered
momentum from, a number of soft law measures and other
initiatives adopted throughout the 1990s. Second, the growing
concern amongst the Member States about increased and
perceptible levels of overt racial discrimination within their
national territories and in particular the entry into government
in Austria of the far right Freedom Party. 1 59 Finally, the adoption
of the directive ahead of the forthcoming enlargement of the
European Union would indicate to the candidate Member States
the European Union's commitment to equality of treatment.I °
The purpose of the directive, as expressed in Article 1, is to
lay down a framework for combating discrimination on the

156 . Id
[ 32-34. For a detailed discussion of this case and in particular its wider
implications. see Christa Tobler, Case C-236109: Association beige des ( onsoinnateurs
Test-Achats ASBI., Yann van Vugt, Charles Basselierv. Conseil des ministres, Judgment of
the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of I Mlarch 2011, 48 COMMON MKT. I. REV. 2041,
2041-60 (2011). See generallY Watson, supra note 140.
157. See Commission Communication to Member States on Guidelines on the
Application of Council Directive 2004/113/EC to Insurance, in the Light of the
Judgment of the Court of Justicc of the European Union in Case C-236/09 (TestAchats), 2011 ().J. 1 9497.
158. See generallY MARK BELL, RACISM AND) EQUALITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

(2009).
159. See Grdinne de Bfirca, The Drafting of the Europear Ur on Charter of
FundamentalRights. 26 EUR. L. RLV. 126. 136 (2001).
160. Christopher Brown. The Race Directive: Towards Equality for All Peoples of
Europe?, 21 Y.B. EUR. I 195, 196-204 (2001).
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grounds of racial or ethnic origin with a view to putting into
effect in the Member States the principle of equal treatment.l61

The Race Directive applies, within the limits of the powers
conferred upon the European Union, to both employmentrelated issues and to matters unrelated to employment such as
social protection, including health care and social assistance,
education, housing, and other goods and services provided to
the general public. In this respect the directive is much broader
in scope than the other equality directives discussed in this
Essay.
The Race Directive, therefore, in principle, extends to
discrimination in matters such as educational fees, restrictions
on the production and sale of foodstuffs, such as halal meat or
kosher products, the allocation of housing (an area in which
discrimination is traditionally rife), and bans of the wearing of
clothing with religious significance, such as certain types of
headwear. 162 The extent of the right to equal treatment with
regard to matters unconnected with employment may in reality
be constrained given that such a right is coterminus with the
extent of the EU's competence.163 Thus its scope of application
with respect to, for example, housing and health care, may be

limited. It is also uncertain to what extent the directive applies
to the provision of services by the private sector in, for example,
banks, shops, and hotels. 164 The lack of any general provision
imposing an obligation to eliminate discrimination in general
public services, such as policing, is also a matter of concern. 165
The Court in Runevi(-V'ardyn v. Vilniaus miesto savivaldb.s
administra@ja1(6 held that national rules that provide that a
person's surname and forename may be entered on a certificate
of civil status of that state only in a form that complies with the
rules governing the spelling of the official national language do
161. Race Directive, supra note 93, art. 1, at 24.

162. Diamian (haliners, The istakes of the Good European?, in DISCRIMINATION
HUNLxN RIGHTS: THL (ASL OF RACISM 215 (Sandra Fredman Ct al. eds., 2001).

ANT)

163. See generally Lisa Waddington, Te, rg the Limits of the EC Treaty Article on Nor
Discrimination, 28 INDUS. LJ. 133 (1999).
164. DAN11EN (HALMERS LT AL.. EUROPLAN UNION LAWv: TLXT AND MATERIALS 913

(2006).
165. Brown, supra note 160, at 215.
166. Runevin-Vardyn v. Vilniats niesLo savivalbd1s admninisxacii.j
[20111 E.C.R. I
(delivered May 12, 2011),
45 (not vet reported).

Case C-391/09,
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not fall within consideration of the Race Directive. Article
3(1) (h) of the Race Directive refers to the access and supply of
goods and services that are available to the public; in Runevi(Tardyn this did not mean that the national rules in issue came
1 7
within the meaning of that provision. 6
The Race Directive applies to all persons regardless of their
nationality.
WVhilst the directive refers only to discrimination on
grounds of racial or ethnic origin, it has been argued that it also
encompasses discrimination on the grounds of skin color even if
this is not expressly articulated.16
In Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding
v. Fenn N\'1 9 the CJ gave a broad interpretation to the types of
acts that may be deemed discriminatory within the meaning of
the directive. It held that a public statement by an employer that
it will not recruit persons of certain ethnic or racial origin,
which is likely to dissuade strongly certain candidates from
submitting their candidature, and accordingly to hinder their
access to the labor market, constitutes direct discrimination
within the meaning of Article 2(2) (a) of the Race Directive. In
Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijdingv. Fern
NV Firma Feryn was seeking to recruit fitters to install doors at
its customers' houses. It placed a large vacancy sign alongside its
premises but made it clear in a public statement to the press that
persons of Moroccan origin would not be recruited. The Court
stated that:
By publicly stating his intention not to hire persons of a
certain racial or ethnic origin, the employer is, in fact,
excluding those persons from the application process and
from his workfloor. He is not merely talking about
1
discrimination, he is discriminating. 7o

167. See Runeoi(-V rdyn, [2011] E.C.R. I
(delivered May 12, 2011), 11 44-45.
168. See Mark Bell, A Patchwork of Protectionism: The New Anti-Discrimination Law
Framework, 67 MOD. L. RLV. 465, 467 (2004).
169. Centrum voor geliikheid van kansen en voor racisnebestrijding v. Feryn NV
(/eon), Case C-54/07. [2008] E.C.R. 1-5187.
170. See Opinion of the Advocate Gencral Maduro. eiUn, [2008] E.C.R. 1-5187,
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The (C further held that the effectiveness of the Race Directive
requires that prohibited discriminatory acts must not be
confined to those where there is an identifiable complainant.
Differences of treatment based on nationality are
excluded. 171 The Race Directive is expressed to be without
prejudice to provisions and conditions relating to the entry into
and residence of third-country nationals and stateless persons
onto the territory of the Member States and to any treatment
that arises from the legal status of such third-country nationals
and stateless persons 72 This exception is probably designed to
avert any challenge to the policies of the Member States on work
permits as being indirectly discriminatory. Whilst the Member
States are in agreement about the application of the principle of
equal treatment as laid down in the directive, within their
national territory they wish to retain control over the entry of
nonnationals onto their territory. In other words, the principle
of equality of treatment is to apply to those who are lawfully
present and resident according to the legal system of each
Member State, regardless of their nationality.
Ascertaining whether discrimination has occurred because
of nationality, and therefore outside the Race Directive, or race,
which is covered by the directive, may be problematic. 73 The
dividing line between discrimination based on race, and
discrimination based on nationality, is often unclear.
VI. THE FRAMEWORK EMPLOYiIE\T DIRECTIVE
The purpose of the Framework Employment Directive is to
lay down a general framework for combating discrimination on
the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual
orientation as regards employment or occupation. 17 The
directive has been described as performing an "exclusionary
function": it excludes religious belief, age, disability, and sexual
171. Member States thus retain their exclusive competence with respct to the
treatment under their national legal systems of third-country nationals. This reflects the
traditional approach of the European Union.
172. SeeRacc Directiv, s p,' note 93, art. 3(2), at 24.
173. See generally Fernne Brennan, The Race Directive, In stitutiroal Racism arnd Third
Countr Nationals, in 2 EUROPEAN UNION LAW FOR THE TWLNTY'-FIRST CENTURY 371
(Takis Tridimnas & Paolisa Ncbbia eds., 2004).
174. See Framework Employment Directive, supra note 94, art. 1, at 18.
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orientation from the range of permissible reasons upon which
an employer may legitimately rely in treating one employee less
15
favorably than another. 7
No definition or guidance is given of any of these concepts
within in Article 19 of the TFEU itself or in the Framework
Employment Directive. Thus far, only the concept of "disability"
has been an issue before the Cj. In Chac6n Navas v. Eurest
Colectividades SA176 the Court adopted a restrictive approach to
the meaning of "disability," drawing a distinction between it and
"sickness." "Disability," it held, must be understood as
"referring to a limitation which results in particular from
physical, mental or psychological impairments and which
hinders the participation of the person concerned in
professional life" and it must be "probable that [this limitation]
will last for a long time." 177 No indication was given as to what
might constitute "a long time." Ms. Chac6n Navas had been
certified as unfit to work, in the short term, on grounds of
sickness in October 2003, and dismissed by her employer in May
2004. There was no information available to the Court on the
nature of Ms. Chac6n Navas's illness. The Court appeared
simply to accept that she was suffering from sickness as opposed
to disability simply because the term "sickness" seems to have
been used by both her medical advisors and her employer. No
attention was paid to the fact that her medical advisors certified
that she was unfit to work in the "short term," which seems to
imply that her condition was ongoing and not just an illness of
finite duration.
Article 2(1) of the Framework Employment Directive
prohibits direct discrimination. In Mangold v. Helm the Court
found that a provision of German law permitting employers to
conclude
without
restriction fixed-term
contracts
of
employment with workers over the age of fifty-two "introduces a
difference of treatment on the grounds directly of age." '17
Similarly, in Hennigs v. Eisenbahn-Bundesamt the Court held that
175. See Opinion of the Advocate General Maduro, Coleman v. Law & Law, Case
C-303/06. [2008] E.C.R. 1-5603, 17.
176. Chacon Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA, Case C-13/05, [2006] E.C.R. I6467. 44.
177. Chac6n Navas, [2006] E.C.R. 1-6467. 1[ 43, 45.
178. See Mangold v.Helm, Case (G144/04, [2005] F.C.R. 1-9981, 1 57.
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a provision in a collective agreement providing that, within each
salary group, basic pay was to be determined by reference to age
1 79
was directly discriminatory.
Coleman raised the issue of whether the directive protects
from discrimination and harassment persons who are not
disabled themselves but are treated less favorably and harassed
on the ground of their association with a person who is
disabled.180 The Court held that the directive was applicable in a
situation where an employee suffers direct discrimination on the
grounds of the disability of her child. The Court stated that an
interpretation of the directive limiting its application only to
people who are themselves disabled "is liable to deprive that
directive of an important element of its effectiveness and to
reduce the protection which it is intended to guarantee."18 1
Therefore, " [w ] here it is established that the unwanted conduct
amounting to harassment which is suffered by an employee who
is not himself disabled is related to the disability of his child,
whose care is provided primarily by that employee, such conduct
18 2
is contrary to the principle of equal treatment."
The Court thus adopted the same approach as it did in
Drake v. ChiefAdjudication Officer,S 3 where it looked at the risk to
which the social security benefit was addressed rather than the
recipient of that benefit.
The Framework Employment Directive is without prejudice
to national laws on marital status and the benefits dependent
thereon. 8 4 In Maruko v. Bfihnen, s 5 Mr. Maruko was refused a
widower's pension when his same-sex life partner died in
January 2005. He and his partner had entered into the life
partnership in November 2001. His claim was refused on the
ground that the pension scheme did not provide for survivors'
pension for life partners. Entitlement was confined to surviving
spouses. In 2001, Germany had altered its legal system to allow
persons of the same sex to live in a union of mutual support and
179. See Hennigs v. Eisenbahn-Bundesamt & Berlin v. Mai, Joined Cases 29798/10, [2011] E.C.R. I
(delivered Sept. 8, 2011).
180. See Coleman, [2008] E.C.R. 1-5603.
181. See id. 1[ 51.
182. Id 59.
183. See Drake v. Chie Adjudication Otticer, Case 150/85. [1986] E.(.R. 1995.
184. See Framework Employment Directive, sup a note 94, puib . 22. at 17.
185. Maruko v. Bfihnen, Case C-267/06, [2008] ECR I-1 757.
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assistance that is normally constituted for life. Having chosen
not to permit persons of the same sex to enter into marriage,
Germany created for same sex couples an equivalent regime, the
life partnership, the conditions of which were made equivalent
to those applicable to marriage. In these circumstances, the cJ
held that if the national court found that surviving spouses and
surviving life partners are in a comparable situation in so far as
concerns the survivors' benefits at issue, life partners who are in
a situation comparable to spouses must therefore be treated in
the same way.
The principle of equal treatment laid down by the directive
is subject to five exceptions. Additionally, Member States are
permitted to make a number of derogations from some of its
provisions. Such exceptions or derogations are subject to the
principle of proportionality.
"With regard to disabled persons, the principle of equal
treatment shall not prejudice the right of Member States to
maintain or adopt provisions on the protection of health and
safety at work or measures aimed at promoting their integration
of the disabled into the working environment.'
The employer
"is obliged, with respect to persons having a particular disability,
under national legislation, to take particular measures" to
provide reasonable accommodation for disabled persons in
87
order to facilitate their effective employment.1
As a general rule, the directive applies "without prejudice"
to measures laid down by national law in the interests of public
security, public order, and the prevention of criminal offences,
for the protection of health, and the rights and freedoms of
others. 188 No such exception figures in any of the gender
discrimination directives or the Race Directive.18 9 It appears to
have been put in during the final negotiations of the text of the
Framework Employment Directive, no evidence of it having
186. Framework Employment Directive, supra note 94, art 7(2), at 20.
187. Id. art. 2(2) (b). at 18-19.
188. Seeid. art. 2(5), at 19.
189. See id art. 3(1), at 19. But it appears that in the legislative process leading to
the adoption of the Race Directive, the Council was unwilling to take into account an
amendment proposed by the European Parliament whereby the exercise by any public
body, including the police, immigration, criminal and civil justice authorities, of its
ftincions would be included the activities specified in Article 3(1) to which the
directive applies.
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appeared in prior drafts. "It was thought necessary to prevent
members of harmful cults, paedophiles, and people with
dangerous physical and mental illnesses from gaining protection
from the Directive." 19"
A further rationale behind this provision may possibly be
found in Recital 18 of the Preamble, which refers to the right of
the armed forces and the prison and emergency services not to
recruit or maintain in employment persons who do not have the
required capacity to perform the function necessary to preserve
the occupational capacity of those services, thereby putting at
risk beneficiaries of those services. 191 The breadth of the
wording of this exception is a cause of concern: "It is ... an
extremely broadly drafted provision, especially given that the
Framework Directive covers only workplace discrimination. The
CJ will have to patrol its boundaries carefully." 192
The directive provides for two other specific exceptions to
the principle of equal treatment. First, it has no application to
differences in treatment based on nationality or conditions
relating to the entry and residence of third-country nationals
and stateless persons. The directive is expressed not to have any
impact on the legal status of such persons. 193 It therefore
respects the confines of Article 19 of the EC Treaty:
discrimination based on nationality remains subject to Article 18
of the TFEU and the rights of third country nationals to enter
and remain in a Member State are within the exclusive
competence of that state. Second, it does not apply to payments
of any kind by state schemes "or similar," including state social
security or social protection schemes. 194
Member States can provide that the directive does not apply
to several situations. First, it does not apply to the armed forces
190. EVI.YN Eii is, EU ANTI-DISCRIMINATION I x/ 291 (2005) (citation omitted).
191. See Framework Employment Directive, supra note 94, pinbl. [ 18. at 17.
192. Ett is, supra note 190, at 291.
193. See Framework Employment Directive, supra note 94, art.3(2), at 19.
194. See Maruko v. Bu6hnen, Case C-267/06. [2008] E.C.R. 1-1757. The CI held
that the directive must be understood as excluding social security and social protection
schemes which were not "pay" within the meaning of Article 157 of the TFEU or
payments of any kind made by the state with the aim of providing access to
employment or maintaining employment. In that case, the Court found that the
characteristics of the swuivvors' pension at issue qualified it to be classified as pay within
the ieaning of EC Treaty Article 141: therefore, it fell within [he scope of the
Framework Employment Directive.
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in so far as it relates to discrimination on the grounds of
disability and age.195 This derogation is broad in scope. It is
intended to enable the Member States to safeguard the combat
effectiveness of their armed forces. The Member States who avail
themselves of this derogation have complete discretion to
determine what constitutes "combat effectiveness" and what is
required to maintain it and accordingly to determine the
employment rights of the disabled and the elderly. Given the
record of some Member States in granting access to women to
employment in the armed forces, 0 b this is a matter of concern.
That said, the exception to the right to equal treatment is
subject to the general principle of proportionality, which should
provide some level of guarantee that national measures will go
no further than a minimal erosion of the right of equal
treatment in employment in the armed forces.
Second, the directive does not apply to:
[T] he fixing for occupational social security schemes of ages
for admission or entitlement to retirement or invalidity
benefits, including the fixing under those schemes of
different ages for employees or groups or categories of
employees and the use of age criteria in actuarial
calculations, does not constitute discrimination on the
grounds of age, provided it does not result in discrimination
1p 7
on the grounds of sex.

Third, the directive does not apply to "occupational
activities within churches and other public or private
organizations the ethos of which is based upon religion or
belief." In such cases:
[D]ifference of treatment based upon a person's religion or
belief shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of
the nature of these activities or the context in which they

are carried out, a person's religion or belief constitutes a

195. See Framework Employment Directive, supra note 94,art. 3(1), at 19.
196. Int'l Power & Others v.NALOO, Joined Cases C-172/01 P. C-175/01 P. C176/01 P & C-180/01 1), [2003] E.C.R. I-11473; Kreil v.Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
Case C-285/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-69; Sirdar v. Army Board, Case C-273/97, [1999] E.C.R.
1-7403; Dori v.Rccreb Srl, Case C-91/92. [1994] E.C.R. 1-3325.
197. Framework Employment Lirective, supra note 94, art. 6(2), at 20.
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genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement.
having regard to the organization's ethos.'19 s
Such organizations can "require individuals working for them to
act in good faith and with loyalty to the organization's ethos." 99
Fourth, the directive does not apply to differences in
treatment on the grounds of age, provided there are objective
reasons for the differential treatment and it is reasonably
justified, within the context of national law, by a legitimate aim
relating to "employment policy, labor market and vocational
training objectives, and if the means of achieving that aim are
'20
appropriate and necessary." 1
Such differences in treatment may include...
(a) the setting of special conditions on access to
employment and vocational training, employment. and
occupation, including dismissal
and
remuneration
conditions for young people, older workers and persons
with caring responsibilities in order to promote their
vocational integration or ensure their protection;
(b) the fixing of minimum conditions of age, professional
experience or seniority in service for access to employment
or to certain advantages linked to employment;
(c) the fixing of a maximum age for recruitment which is
based on the training requirements of the post in question
or the need for a reasonable period of employment before
20
retirement. I
These exceptions and derogations must be interpreted strictly
and confined to the precise objectives for which they are
02
allowed.2

In the case of Palacios de la Villa v. CorTleiel Servicios SA, 203
the Court found that the absence of a specific reference to a
198. Id. art. 4(2). at 19.
199. Id. art. 4(2), at 19.
200. Id. art. 6(1), at 19-20.
201. Id. art. 6(2), at 20.
202. Cf Sirdar v. Army Bd., Case (-273/97, [1999] E.C.R. 1-7403; johnston v.
Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster (onstabulm), Case 222/84, [1986] E.C.R. 1651; see
also Prigge v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG Case C-447/09. [2011] E.C.R. I
(delivered
Sept. 13, 2011) (not yet reported) (holding that air traflic safety did not lall within the
aims referred to in Ai ticle 6 (1)).
203. See Palacios de la Villa v. Cortefiel Servicios SA, Case C-411/05. [2007] E.(.R.
1-8531.
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particular policy objective in a collective agreement that was
discriminatory but allegedly justifiable under Article 6(1) as
being necessary to achieve that objective "alone was not
decisive." A national employment policy of the kind envisaged
by Article 6(1) need not be articulated in each and every
measure that, although discriminatory within the meaning of
Article 2 of the directive, seeks to implement that policy. "It
cannot be inferred from Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/78 that
the lack of precision in the national legislation at issue as
regards the aim pursued automatically excludes the possibility
2° 4
that it may be justified under that provision'
However, it is necessary from the general context of the
measure to enable its underlying aim to be identified. This
principle was confirmed in Age Concern England v. Secretaty of
o5

State:2

Mere generalisations concerning the capacity" of a specific
measure to contribute to employment policy, labour market
or vocational training objectives are not enough to show
that the aim of that measure is capable of justifying
derogation from that principle and do not constitute
evidence on the basis of which it could reasonably be
considered that the means chose are suitable for achieving
that aim .... 211

In the absence of any precise indication of the objective of a
particular piece of legislation as to its aims, other elements,
taken from the general context of the measure concerned,
enable the underlying aim of the measure to be identified for
the purposes of review by the courts whether it is legitimate and
whether the measures put in place to achieve that aim are
appropriate and necessary. Policy statements and travaux
pr6paratoires, parliamentary debates, or statements of reason
for the measure in question could be relevant 2 07Aiticle 6(1)
204. See Palaciosde [a Villa, [2007] E.C. R. 1-8531,
56.
205. The Queen, on the Application of Incorp. Trs. of the Nat'l Council for
Ageing v. Sec'y of State for Bus., Enter. & Regulaton7 Reform (Age Concern England),
Case C-388/07. [2009] E.C.R. 1-1569.

206. Id. 1[51.
207. See, e.g, Petersen v. Berufingsausschuss fir Zahnarzte Fir den Bezirk
Westfalen-Lippe, Case C-341/08, [2010] E.C.R. 1-47, [ 40; Age Concern England. [2009]
E.C.R. 1-1569,
45: Palacios de la Vila, [2007] E.C.R. 1-8531. 1[ 57; see also Georgiev v.
Tehnicheski Universitet-Sofia filial Plovdiv,Joined Cases (-250 & 268/09, [2010] E.C.R.
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"imposes on Member States the burden of establishing to a high
standard of proof the legitimacy of the aim relied on as a
08
justification."2
The Member States enjoy broad discretion in their choice
of social and employment policy objectives but also in the
20 9
definition of the measures capable of achieving them..
Most of the cases that have come before the cJ under this
directive have been concerned with age discrimination. In all of
these cases, the Court found discriminatory conduct but
proceeded to consider whether it fell within any of the
exceptions or derogations provided for in the directive. These
cases mainly concerned Article 6(1), although Articles 2(5) and
4(1) have also been invoked. Only one case concerns access to
employment; the others are all related to dismissal and
compulsory retirement issues.
In Wolf v. Stadt Frankfurt am iMlain,2 10 Mr. Wolf applied for a
position in the fire services of the City of Frankfurt. His
application was turned down on the ground that he was over
thirty years of age. There was an age limit of thirty years on
recruitment for the particular category of job, an intermediate
career post, for which Wolf had applied. Although the national
court referred nine questions on the compatibility of the age
limit with Article 6(1), the Court chose to consider the issue
under Article 4(1) of the directive: was the statutory age limit for
access to an intermediate career in the fire service a "genuine
and determining occupational requirement" within the
meaning of Article 4(1)? 2 1 The Court found that it was.
I
(delivered Sept. 2, 2010) (not yet reported). At issue in Geo",.ev was a provision
of Bulgarian law providing for the compulsory retirement of university profelssors at the
age of sixty-eight but that, at the same time, made their employment after the age of
sixty-five subject to fixed one-year contracts renewable only twice, such conracts being
less favorable than the contracts of tenured professors. Whilst the (.1 was prepared to
accept that these arrangements could be justifiable in the interest of maintaining the
quality of university teaching and thre allocations of academic posts amongst the
generations. it could find no evidence that this was in fact the objective of such
measures. See Georgiev, [2010] E.C.R. I
(delivered Sept. 2, 2010).
208. Age Concern England. [2009] E.C.R. 1-1569, 1[67.
209. See Opinion of Advocate General Mazak, Palaciosde la Villa, [2007] E.(.R. 18531, 74 (stating that only a "manilestly disproportionate national measure should be
censured" by the Court of Justice).
210. Wolfv. Stadt Frankfurt am Main. Case C-229/08, [2010] E.C.R. I-1.
211. See id.1[24-47.
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Employees in intermediate career paths in fire services carry out
tasks such as fighting fires, rescuing persons, and dealing with
dangerous animals. Such tasks require exceptionally high
physical strength and can only be performed by young persons.
According to the Court, "the need to possess full physical
capacity to carry on the occupation of a person in the
intermediate career of the fire services is related to the age of
22
the persons in that career.'"
In Seda Kiiikdeveci v.Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, 2 13 the
claimant had been employed from the age of eighteen by
Swedex. She was dismissed after ten years of service. Her notice
period was calculated as if she had been in employment for
three years instead of ten years. This was in accordance with
German law under which periods of employment before the age
of twenty-five years are not taken into account in calculating the
notice period for dismissal. The Court held that such a provision
must be regarded as relating to conditions of dismissal. It was
discriminatory in that it afforded less favorable treatment
between persons with the same length of service. As to whether
the difference in treatment could be justified, it appeared that
the objective of the legislation, adopted in 1926, was to lighten
the burden on employers imposed by lengthy notice periods
and to introduce some fluiditv into the labor market. The
legislation reflected the legislature's assessment that younger
workers react more rapidly to the loss of their jobs, and greater
flexibility may be demanded of them. A shorter period of notice
for young workers also facilitates their recruitment by increasing
the flexibility of personnel management. However the Court was
not impressed with this argument pointing out that the
legislation applies to all employees who joined their employing
organization before the age of twenty-five regardless of when
they were dismissed-they could have in fact completed a long
period of service and might not therefore be young workers.
Accordingly, it ruled that the legislation was not appropriate for
achieving its purported aim.

212. Id. 141.
213. Kidikdeved v. Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-555/07. [2010] E.C.R.
1-365.
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In Andersen v. Region Syddanmar,21 4 Andersen worked for
the Region of Southern Denmark from 1979 until 2006 when he
was sixty-three years old. Danish law grants a severance
allowance to workers employed in the same undertaking for at
least twelve years. The allowance is not payable to workers who,
on termination of their employment relationship, are entitled to
an old age pension under an occupational pension scheme. Mr.
Andersen was entitled to such a pension but he wished to
remain on the labor market and registered as a job seeker with
the relevant employment services. He intended to waive his
pension rights. The Court found that the Danish law was
discriminatory: it treated persons in the same situation, that is
those who had worked for twelve years with the same employer,
differently. It then went on to consider whether such a
difference in treatment could be justified under Article 6(1).
The objective of the severance allowance was to facilitate
employees who had worked for an employer for a long period of
time to move jobs by providing them with the means to acquire
new skills to get a new job. This, the Court found, was a
legitimate employment policy and labor market objective within
the meaning of A ticle 6(1). Generally those who were entitled
to an old age pension left the job market. They were not
therefore in need of the severance allowance. Although the
exclusion of those who left the labor market from entitlement to
the severance allowance was not manifestly inappropriate to the
attainment of the objective of the legislation, the exclusion of
workers who were eligible for a pension was disproportionate. By
precluding payment of the allowance to workers who, although
eligible for an old age pension from their employer, nonetheless
intended to waive the right to a pension and continue working,
went beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective of the
legislation governing the severance allowance.
There have been a number of cases on compulsory
retirement age requirements that either require a worker to
leave the labor market at a given age or that alter the
arrangements under which they continue working, such as

214. Andersen v. Region Syddamlark, Case C-499/08. [2010] E.C.R. I
(delivered Oct. 12, 2010) (not yet reported).
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moving from tenured posts or indefinite contracts of
employment to short term fixed contracts.
In Maingold v. Hebr -'25 the Court held that a provision of
German law whereby all workers who had reached the age of
fifty-two "without distinction... may, until the age at which they
may claim their entitlement to a retirement pension, be offered
fixed-term contracts of employment which could be renewed an
indefinite number of times," could not be objectivelyjustified.21Y
The age of the worker was the only criterion for the application
of fixed-term contracts of employment. It had not been shown
that the "fixing of an age threshold, as such, regardless of any
other consideration linked to the structure of the labour market
or the personal situation of the person concerned, [was]
objectively necessary to attainment of the objective which is the
vocational integration of the unemployed older worker," as had
been argued by the German government217 The Court found
that the consequence of the law was:
This significant body of workers, determined solely on the
basis of age, is thus in danger, during a substantial part of its
members' working life, of being excluded from the benefit
of stable employment which, however, as the Framework
Agreement makes clear, constitutes a major element in the
protection of workers.

91 8

In Petersen v. BeruunsausschussJiPr Zahndrzte Or den Beziyh
T'sq'lden-Lippe,219 Mrs. Petersen was refused authorization to
practice as a panel dentist after the age of sixty-eight. Panel
dentists were obliged to retire at the age of sixty-eight in order
to protect the health of patients insured under the statutory
health scheme since it was believed that the performance of
those dentists declined from that age. The Court found that
because ninety percent of patients in Germany are treated by
panel dentists, the inability to practice under the panel scheme
affected conditions of access to employment and was
discriminatory in the sense that panel dentists are treated less
215. Mangoldv. Helm, Case C-144/04. [2005] E.C.R. 1-9981.
216. Id. 1[64.
217. Id.1 3.

218. Id. 1[64.
219. Peterscn v. Bcrufimgsausschuss fr
Westfalen Lippe, Case -341/ 08,[2{
E.C.R. 1-47.

ZainArzt

fr

den

Bczirk

1474 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAIWJOURNAL [Vol. 35:1426
favorably than other persons practicing on the panel scheme
solely because of their age. The referring Court mentioned
several objectives for this rule but it was unclear as to precisely
which of these objectives the rule was meant to address. No
reference was made to travaux pr~paratoires, parliamentary
debates, or any statement of reasons that might offer assistance
as to what the rule was meant to achieve. The Court, therefore,
whilst acknowledging that it was for the national court to discern
the objective of the rule, proceeded to examine its legitimacy in
the light of its three purported objectives. The first objective was
that the law was supposedly designed to protect public healthan objective which the Court found to be a legitimate social
policy objective both on the basis of Article 2(5) of the directive
and the general rule that Member States have a broad discretion
in organizing their social security and health care schemes. The
Court, however, found that the legislation lacked a consistency
in the sense that nonpanel dentists were not required to retire at
sixty-eight years: "A measure to which there is so broad an
exception as that for dentists practising outside the panel system
cannot be regarded as essential for the protection of public
health."220

Prigge v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG221 and Fuchs & Kdhler v.
Hessen 222 may be compared and contrasted with Petersen. Prigge
concerned a collective agreement applicable to the crew of
Deutsche Lufthansa, which prohibited pilots from working as
such after the age of sixty years. Both national and international
law provided that pilots should retire at the age of sixty-five but
that between the ages of sixty and sixty-four they should work as
part of a multi-pilot crew and the other members of that crew
should be under sixty. These rules were designed to ensure air
traffic safety in that airline pilots must possess particular physical
capabilities that might diminish with age. As such, these rules
could be considered a "genuine and determining" occupational
requirement within the meaning of Article 4(1). The J found
that the compulsory retirement age of sixty laid down in the
220. Id. 1[61.
221. Prigge v. Deutsche ILufthansa AG, Case C-447/09, [2011] E.C.R. I
(delivered Sept. 13, 2011) (not yet reported).
222. Fuchs & Kbhler v. Hessen, Joined Cases 159-60/10. [2011] E.C.R. I
(delivered july 21, 2011) (not yet reported).
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collective agreement to be disproportionate given that both
national and international law set the age of compulsory
retirement at sixty-five.
Fuchs & Ke;hler concerned the retirement age of civil
servants, in this case public prosecutors, in Germany. The
retirement age was set at sixty-five but, exceptionally, a civil
servant could continue to work until the age of sixty-eight if he
so requested, and his continued employment was in the interests
of the service. In the case of a public prosecutor, it might be in
the interest of the service if he were allocated a case in which
proceedings were not finished by the time he reached sixty-five.
Rather than reallocate the case to another prosecutor, it might
be more efficient for him to continue on the matter until
proceedings had terminated. The Court found, in contrast to
Petersen, that the rule in question did not lack coherence when
contrasted with the general retirement scheme for civil servants.
The compulsory retirement age was sixty-five and it was only in
certain limited cases that civil servants could work beyond that
age. The position in Petersen was otherwise in that where the
retirement age of two groups of persons doing work of the same
nature in the same profession differed according to whether
they were employed in the private or public sector. In Rosenbladt
22
v. Oellerking Gebafidereinigungsges. mbH, Mrs. Rosenbladt 3
worked as cleaner in a barracks for thirty-nine years-hardly a
comfortable way of life, but she was no doubt a sturdy and
reliable employee. She was entitled to a very low pension and so
wished to remain employed. Her contract provided that it would
terminate at the end of the calendar month in which the
employee could claim a retirement pension or at age sixty-five,
whichever was later. The German government argued that this
rule was the
[R]eflection of a political and social consensus which ha[d]
endured for many years in Germany. That consensus [wa]s
based primarily on the notion of sharing employment
between the generations. The termination of the

223. See Roscnbladt v. Oellerking Gebafidereinigungsges. ibH, Case C-45/09,
2010] E.C.R. I
(delivered Oct. 12, 2010) (not yet reported).
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employment contracts of those employees directly benefits
224
young workers by making it easier for them to find work.
The Court accepted that this practice of automatic
retirement, which it observed, had been a feature of
employment law in many Member States, could be regarded as
objectively and reasonably justified within the meaning of
Article 6(1) of the directive. As to whether it was appropriate
and necessary, the Court stated that legislation such as that in
issue in Rosenbladt takes account of the fact that persons
concerned are entitled to financial compensation by means of a
replacement income in the form of a retirement income. Thus it
was not unreasonable for a Member State to take the view that a
measure such as the authorization of clauses on automatic
termination of employment contracts at a given age was
justified. However, such a measure could be regarded as
disproportionate given the fact that the termination of
employment contracts at a given age could cause financial
hardship, precisely as in the circumstances of Mrs. Rosenbladt,
and indeed others in low-paid jobs whose pension entitlement
was poor.
Given the fact that German employment legislation does
not prevent a person who has reached retirement age from
continuing to work-there is no obligation to exit the labor
market-coupled with the protection from discrimination from
age, the Court found that the legislation in question did not go
beyond what is necessary to achieve the aims it is designed to
pursue. This reasoning, however, may be queried. Although
theoretically a person can reenter the labor market after
retirement, just how easy is it to get employment after
retirement age in an employment culture that provides for
automatic termination of employment at a given age? What
about loss of seniority and other employment rights following
the rupture of an employment relationship? What about the
consequences for pension entitlement? These are issues that
may place a person retired compulsorily in a much less favorable
position than before retirement.

224. Id.

43.
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CONCLUSIONS: WHERE DOES EUROPE STAND NOW?
From the original, somewhat arid and generally formulated
provisions of the EEC Treaty drafted more than half a century
ago, we have seen a gradual commitment on the part of the
European Union to achieving equality amongst its citizens.
Nationality and gender were the first grounds on which
discrimination was prohibited. The past fifteen years have seen
an expansion of the prohibition on discrimination into other
areas where it is most commonly found: race, religion or belief,
age, disability, and sexual orientation.
Although the principle of equality is now enshrined in the
treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as in
discrimination-specific legislation, equality rights have beenand continue to a large extent to be-developed through the
case law of the CJ. This case law has created a corpus of equality
rights, influencing both treaty and legislative developments,
which has had a profound impact upon the lives of the people
of Europe. For all the rhetoric-and considerable this rhetoric
has been-emanating from politicians and lawmakers, it is not
from them that equality has come. It has come essentially from
citizens themselves, insisting on their rights and bringing legal
proceedings to enforce them the length and breadth of Europe,
and from a Court willing to assume the responsibility of putting
flesh on skeletal legal provisions to bring them to life in a
manner that will achieve their declared objectives. The Court's
approach has been functional; it has looked at the objectives of
rules upon which it is asked to adjudicate and interpreted them
according to what they were designed to achieve as well as wider
EU objectives. Exceptions and derogations have been required
to be proportionate and appropriate to the objectives that they
seek to achieve. All types of discriminatory conduct have been
prohibited regardless of to whom that conduct has been
addressed.
At the same time, both in legislation and case law, we see
differences in the application of the principle of equality. A
hierarchy of norms can be detected.225 Whilst employmentrelated discrimination is prohibited in all the spheres to which
discrimination legislation is addressed, it is only in the case of
225. See generyall Bell & Waddington, supra note 95.

1478 FORDHAM INTERAA TIOAAL LA 14

URNAL [Vol. 35:1426

gender discrimination and racial and ethnic discrimination that
nonemployment related discrimination is addressed, and even
then it is more widely prohibited on racial and ethnic grounds
than on the basis of gender. The Race Directive and the Recast
Directive impose a duty on the Member States to designate a
body for the promotion of equal treatment of all persons
without discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin,
but there is no comparable obligation in the Framework
Employment Directive. Under the Race Directive, direct
discrimination can be justified on two grounds only: genuine
and determining occupational requirements and positive action.
The Framework Employment Directive, however, allows many
more exceptions and derogations and the Court has adopted a
fairly nonrestrictive approach to them, being particularly
deferential to Member States' social and employment policies
where such policies are invoked to justify discrimination. Within
the gender discrimination directives, disparities can also be
noted, particularly in the sphere of indirect discrimination,
where age related discrimination in social security can result in
the prejudicial treatment of women. The attainment of equal
treatment in occupational social welfare schemes is similarly
constrained.
The end result is a fragmentation of equality rights with
variable standards of protection. This in itself leads to
inequalities and, moreover, makes it difficult to bring claims of
multiple types of discrimination or intersectional discrimination
where disparity of treatment is alleged on more than one
ground. This has been the subject of criticism 226 but whether it
2 7
should be so or not is debatable. 2

226. See generall Mark Bell, Advarcing EU Anti-Discrn,,o, Law: The Europear
Comrvsior s 2008 Proposal foir
Nea Directive, 3 EoU.AL Ris. RLV. 7 (2009); Lisa
Waddington, Future Prospectsfor EU Equality Law: Lessons to be Learnt from the Proposed
Equoal Treatment Directive. 36 EUR. L. RFV. 163 (2011).

227. See Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions:
Non-Discrininaion and Equal Opportunities: A Renewed Commitment, COM (2008)
420 Final, at 5 (nly 2008) ("The various grounds of discriminaion diffir substantially,

and each demands a tailored response. This is not a question of creating a hierarchy
between various grounds but of delivering the most appropriate form of protection for
each of them.").
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The proposed directive on implementing the principle of
equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or
belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation 228 may go towards
reducing the disparities current in the equality area. The
purpose of this instrument is to supplement the Framework
Employment Directive, but by a separate instrument. The object
is to extend the principle of equal treatment beyond the sphere
of employment by prohibiting discrimination based on religion
or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation in both the public
and private sectors in social protection, social advantages,
education, and access to the supply of goods and services that
are available to the public including housing. Only goods and
services provided on a commercial basis are covered by the
proposal as it now stands. This proposal, however, will not bring
the protection offered to victims of discrimination of the
grounds of age, religion or belief disability, or sexual orientation
on all fours with victims of racial or ethnic discrimination. The
scope of the proposed directive is narrower than that of the
Race Directive and so inequalities between victims of
2 29
discrimination may continue.
The proposed directive is in the mold of the existing
directives in that it does not provide any definition of what
constitutes the various grounds of discrimination. This leaves
the extent of the rights and obligations set out in them
uncertain and generally undermines their effectiveness. It is not
easy for individuals, their employers, and others upon whom
obligations are imposed. Ultimately, in the absence of more
precise definitions in legislation, individuals may have to resort
to legal proceedings and it will be left to the cJ to define the
meaning of key concepts. This has caused difficulties with
respect to the definition of "disability" adopted by the Court in
Chac6n Navas, which is somewhat narrower than that envisaged
by the legislator and fits ill with the definition of disability in the
U.nited Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities to which the European Union acceded at the end of
228. Proposal for a Council Directive on Implementing the Principle of Equal
Treatment between Persons Irrespective of Religion of Belief, Disability, Age or Sexual
Orientation, COM (2008) 426 Final (Iuly 2008).
229. For a detailed analysis see Erica Howard, EL Equality Law: Three Recent
Devdoprments, 17 EUR. I.J. 785, 788 (2011).
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2010. Although the European Parliament has proposed
inserting a definition based on that set out in the Convention
into the proposed directive, this has not as yet happened.
The proposed directive has also been criticized on the
ground that it does not address discrimination based on an
assumption or assumptive discrimination. This occurs where a
person is assumed to have certain characteristics, which in fact
he or she does not have, and is subject to discriminatory
treatment because of that assumption. This omission may not in
fact be too serious since the approach of the J to associative
discrimination in Coleman might also encompass assumptive
discrimination as indeed might the broad view of what
constitutes discriminatory conduct in Fepyn.
Moving away now from the minutiae of legislation, let us
consider two general developments that might have an impact
on that legislation. Mention has been made of the general
principle of equality in the introductory section of this Essay,
and it has been pointed out that that principle has now been
enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which now has
treaty status. A ticles 21 and 23 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights state specifically that any discrimination based on a wide
variety of grounds is prohibited and equality between men and
women must be ensured in all areas.23, In Test-Achats the Cj
found that derogation from the principle of equality of
treatment in the insurance sector, which Member States were
entitled to avail themselves of on an indefinite basis, was
unlawful. What are the implications of that ruling for other
directives on equality all of which have provisions that bear a
similarity to that in issue in Test-Achats? The Race Directive
permits Member States to allow for differential treatment where
a characteristic related to racial or ethnic origin constitutes a
"genuine and determining occupational requirement" provided
that the objective is legitimate and proportionate. The
Framework Employment Directive contains the same possible
exception. Both directives allow for positive action. Article
157(4) of the TFEU allows for positive action in the sphere of
equal pay. The Recast Directive also provides for positive

230. Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 64. arts. 21, 23. 2010 0.:. C 83, at
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measures "with a view to ensuring full equality in practice
between men and women in working life. 2,1
As we have seen, the Framework Employment Directive
allows for numerous other exceptions and derogations to the
principle of equal treatment, notably in the case of differences
of treatment on the grounds of age. All of these exceptions
relate to situations of direct discrimination and all give Member
States the possibility of derogating from the principle of equal
treatment for an indefinite period of time. None of the
directives requires, as the Goods and Services Directive does,
that the measures for which an exemption or derogation may be
claimed be in place at the time of the adoption of the directive,
and none prohibits the permitted differential treatment
measures from being introduced after the date of the adoption
of the directive or required date of transposition of the directive.
None requires, as the Goods and Service Directive does, specific
regular reporting on the operation of the derogations, in
particular, the premises upon which they are permissible. All
suffer from the defect, which influenced the Advocate General
in Test-Achats in forming her view of the invaliditv of Ar ticle
5 (2), that it may lead to differential treatment in some Member
States depending on whether or not a Member State has chosen
to avail itself of the derogation or exemption in question. This
in turn creates differences between the laws of the Member
States themselves.
The Equal Treatment in Social Security Directive is even
more to the point. The directive was required to be transposed
into national law by December 23, 1984-that is some twentyseven years ago. It allows Member States to derogate from the
principle of equality in five sets of circumstances-all related to
retirement-in which traditionally women have been treated
more advantageously than men. In Richards v.Secretaiy of Statefor
Work & Pensions, 232 the Court held that this possibility of
derogation was intended "to maintain temporarily the
advantages accorded to women with respect to retirement in
order to enable them progressively to adapt their pension

231. Recast Directive, supranote 91, art. 3, at 27.
232. Richards v.Sc'y of State for Work & Pensions. Case C-423/04, [2006] E.C.R.
1-3585.
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systems... without
disrupting
the
complex
financial
n '3
equilibrium of those systems
What is interesting is that the Court pointed to the
temporary nature of the permitted derogations in a judgment
handed down in 2006, in the case of a directive adopted on
December 23, 1978, which was required to be implemented by
the Member States by December 23, 1984. It seems difficult to
reconcile this situation with that prevailing in Test-Achats. The
Equal Treatment in Social Security Directive appears to allow
Member States to derogate from the principle of equal
treatment in the specified situations on an indefinite basis.
Although exceptions and derogations are often spoken of in the
same breathe and the term used interchangeably, or collectively
referred to as "exemptions," it seems that after Test-Achats they
are two quite different concepts. Exceptions-applicable
throughout the European Union to the principle of equal
treatment-appear to be permissible. Advocate General Kokott,
in Paragraph 34 of her opinion stated that: "Within the limits of
the prohibition on taking arbitrary measures the Council could
therefore in principle also have exempted some services like
insurance entirely from the scope of [the Goods and Services

Directive]

."234

However, where the Council has acted, the possibility of
allowing Member States at their discretion to derogate from the
provisions of a directive laying down equal treatment seems,
after Test-Achats, to be limited. Derogations can be allowed but
only for limited and relatively short periods of time. This must
have implications for the validity of provision in other equality
directives allowing derogations for indefinite periods of time.
The second development that is significant is the ruling in
Mangold to the effect that the Framework Employment Directive
did not in itself lay down the principle of equal treatment. The
principle of equal treatment on grounds of age was a "general
principle of Community law," the directive being a specific
expression of it.
The Cj confirmed this view in Kihiikdeveci and
more recently in Prigge.

233. Id. 1[35.
234. Opinion of Advocate General Kokot, Test-Achats. Case C-236/09. [2011]
E.C.R. I
,(delivered Mar. 1, 2011) (not yet reported).
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Two Advocates General have expressed doubts on whether
such a general principle exists. In Lindorfer v. Counil, 25
Advocate General Sharpston states that it was reasonable to read
Mangold as referring to the general principle of equality, the
specific prohibition of age discrimination, in both national and
international law, being "too recent and uneven to meet such a
description."'' 6 In Bartsch v. Bosch und Siemens Hausgerdte (BSH)
AltersJiirsorge GmbH 23 7 she reiterated her view, reasoning it at
length and with conviction. Subsequently, in Palacios de la lla,
Advocate General Mazdk pointed out that although reliance had
been placed by the cJ in Mangold238 on various international
instruments and constitutional traditions common to the
Member States from which it could conclude that there was a
general principle of nondiscrimination on the grounds of age,
those instruments referred for the most part to the general
principle. The Advocate General, therefore, did not find the
conclusion drawn in Mangold to be "particularly compelling."
He concluded that if the reasoning in Mangold were followed to
its logical conclusion, then not only the prohibition on the
grounds of age, but all the specific prohibitions of the types of
discrimination referred to in Article 1 of the Framework
Employment Directive would have to be regarded as general
principles of EU law.
There is no doubt that progress has been made in achieving
equality between the European Union's citizens, particularly in
the last fifteen years. However, much remains to be done.
Legislation continues to be drafted in terms that are vague,
notably in the failure to define key concepts that determine the
effectiveness of directives. The result is confusion as to the exact
scope and content of rights and obligations, which may only
become clear following legal proceedings. It is then left to the
Cg to try and discern what concepts such as "disability" or
"religion or belief' might mean-a challenging task that,
arguably, should never have been imposed upon it.

235. Lindorfcr v. Council, Case C-227/04. [2007] E.C.R. 1-6767.
236. Id. 1[55.
237. Bartsch v.Bosch und Siemens Hausgerate (BSH) Alitersffirsorge GmbH, Case
C-427/06. [2008] E.C.R. 1-7245.
238. Opinion of Advocae Gencral MazAk,Palacios de la Villa v.CortCFicl Scvicios

SA,Case C-41 1/05, [2007] E.C.R. 1-853 1.
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The proposal for a directive made in 2008 to extend the
principle of nondiscrimination articulated in the Framework
Employment Directive to nonemployment matters is making
little progress. In its absence sharp differences will remain in the
level of protection against discrimination on the grounds of
gender, race, and the other prohibited grounds.
To end on a general note, the exact implications of the
Mangold case law, in which the Cj found that there was a general
principle against age discrimination in EU law, and the case of
Test-Achats, which could be seen to throw into doubt many of the
provisions in the equality directives providing for derogations
from the principle of equality, remain inconclusive. If pushed to
their outer limits, these cases could prove seismic for EU
equality law, as indeed could the Charter of Fundamental
Rights, which contains many provisions on equality, the status of
which is, at the time of writing, uncertain. If these are ultimately
found to have horizontal direct effect,2 1 with the result that they
may be invoked in proceedings between private parties, then
perhaps we can speak of true equality amongst Europe's citizens.

239. See Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak, Dominguez v. Ceinre
informatique du Centre ()uest Aflantique & Prelet de la region Centre, Case 282/ 10,
[2012] ECR I
(delivered Jan. 24, 2012) (no yCt reported); see also Reimann v.
Philipp Halter GmiibH & Co. Sprenguniternehien KG, Case C-C-317/11 (pending
case).

